On the Static Vs. Dynamic Dialectics of Kant and Hegel

One of the most fundamental differences between the dialectics of Kant and Hegel centers on the issue of stasis versus motion. Kant’s position is characterized by static distinctions between appearances and things-in-themselves; but this position necessarily collapses into Hegel’s inverted world and ultimately acceptance of contradiction via the movement of infinity.
In order to properly understand the issue of stasis versus motion it is of key importance to have a firm grasp on categorical logic in general and contradiction in particular. Categorical logic is an analytic form of logic that was first developed by Aristotle, and proved to be of great importance in the development of Western thought(Layman 163). This traditional form of logic is characterized by categorical arguments, which are those whose validity is dependant upon relationships among classes, sets, and categories. Such arguments are composed of categorical statements that relate to two categories or classes—e.g. all humans are mammals. This example, however, represents only one of four possible forms of categorical statements, namely the universal affirmative: “All S are P”. Other forms of categorical statements include: universal negative (No S are P), particular affirmative (Some S are P), and particular negative (Some S are not P).
With this understanding of categorical statements out of the way, we may now move on to an exploration of the relationships between such statements. First, contraries refer to relationships between universal affirmative and universal negative statements. Such relationships can both be false, but cannot both be true (Layman 171). For example, the statements “all S are P” and “no S are P” cannot both be true, as the truth of one statement implies the falsity of the other. Secondly, subcontraries refer to the relationship between particular affirmative and particular negative statements, such that both statements can be true, but they cannot both be false.
Perhaps most importantly for this work is the relationship between corresponding universal affirmative and particular negative statements or corresponding universal negative and particular affirmative statements. Such a relationship is contradictory, meaning that they cannot both be true, yet both cannot be false(Layman 171). In other words, if we are given the universal affirmative statement: “All S are P” it may be immediately concluded that the particular negative statement: “Some S are not P” is false and visa versa. However, it remains a logical impossibility the both of these statements could be false.
The law of excluded middle and the law of noncontradiction are both implicit within these relationships of categorical statements. These two analytic laws are of fundamental importance for Kant and his static position. The law of excluded middle
(p v ~p) states that “for any given statement, either it or its negation is true”(Layman 313). For example, we may formulate this as either “a human being is free” (p) or “a human being is not free” (~p). To deny this law, is to deny the law of noncontradiction (~(p·~p)), or the law that states that contradictions can never be true. This law is of such importance to analytic logic that “all logicians endorse the law of noncontradiction”(Layman 313). With this in mind, we may now turn out attention towards Kant, the problems he found in relation to these laws of logic, and the solutions he proposed.
Kant begins his colossal Critique of Pure Reason by noting that metaphysics, as it existed at his time, is a mere speculative science has been “a merely random groping, and, what is worst of all, a groping among mere concepts”(Kant 21). Metaphysics is not on the secure path of a science, as it has not progressed in any substantial way, and its students have been arguing the same problems that they have been for hundreds of years. Kant, however, recognizes that mathematics, physics, and logic are most certainly on the secure path, and so he endeavors to discover the means by which these fields became actual sciences in the hopes of getting metaphysics itself on the same secure path.
To this end, he begins with the science of logic, which has, “from the earliest times, proceeded upon this sure path”(Kant 17). Since Aristotle, logic has not been required to retrace its steps, save for a few elaborations and eliminations of redundant material. Also, students of logic typically do not disagree with its laws and propositions, and so, it seems to be a completed body of knowledge. We may, then, say with confidence that we have discovered the science of logic and its laws are apodictic. The laws of this science, however, only deal with reason itself and are only applicable to the operations of the human mind. In this way, logic may be best described as the “vestibule of the sciences”(Kant 18).
Where the science of logic must deal only with reason itself, the natural sciences, such as physics, must deal with empirical objects as well. The question then becomes: how did natural science come to be on the secure path? Natural science itself was a process of mere random groping prior to an intellectual revolution of sorts. To illustrate the nature of this revolution, Kant sites the experimental methods of Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl(Kant 20). All three of these scientists devised experiments based on principles of reason, and subsequently turned to the natural world for conformation or rejection. Rather than letting nature pull the strings, as it were, this intellectual revolution saw reason itself take the reigns and demand answers from nature. In this way, the necessary laws of nature began to be discovered in reason itself, with nature only providing the necessary verification or falsification.
For Kant, this seems to amount to an extremely radical reversal. Thoughts were once considered to conform to objects, but it now appears as if objects conform to thoughts, in some sense. Logic and natural science are undoubtedly on the secure path, and it seems as if entrance to that path is characterized by exploration of the principles of reason and application of them to the natural world. Kant, then, seeks to apply this same model to the study of metaphysics, so that it to may be on the secure path, and at the same time he provides the transcendental justification for the existence of such sciences.
To address this issue, Kant proposes a Copernican revolution of metaphysics(Kant 22). Copernicus was unable to make any progress in explaining the motions of heavenly bodies while operating under the assumption that the earth was stationary and the heavens moved. In response to this, he developed a system where the earth traveled and the stars remained stationary. Metaphysics has long assumed that our ideas and understanding are derived from objects, and this position has lead to the metaphysical bungling that has inhibited it from being a secure science. Additionally, this position also stands contrary to the ways in which natural science actually progresses, in that it discovers the laws that govern nature a priori in the understanding. So, Kant proposes a metaphysical revolution, such that objects of experience must appear to us in conformity with our reason, rather than our reason conforming to objects. In this way, we may have a priori principles, and the intellectual revolution of the natural sciences remains justified. With this revolution, metaphysics may enter upon the secure path of a science; however, this new metaphysical standpoint is not without its problematic aspects.
Before exploring the problematic aspects of this metaphysical standpoint, we must have a firm grasp on the limits of the understanding, and the distinction Kant draws between appearances and things-in–themselves. It has already been explained that objects of experience must conform to a priori concepts of the understanding. But what exactly is an ‘object of experience’? Kant draws a very important distinction between objects as they appear to us (objects of experience) and things-in-themselves. Objects appear to us in such a way that they must be in accordance with our forms of sensibility (space and time) and categories of the understanding (such as cause and effect) for us to have experience of them. The realm of things-in-themselves, however, is completely supersensible, in that these things-in-themselves exist as such, meaning that they do not conform to space, time, cause and effect, etc. We seen then, that because we have no means of understanding things-in-themselves, “we are brought to the conclusion that we can never transcend the limits of possible experience”(Kant 24).
Reason, however, naturally transcends these boundaries of experience, gives its subjective concepts of the understanding objective validity, and necessarily finds itself involved with illusory truths. Reason is of the sort that it demands sufficient reason for events that it experiences. Take cause and effect for example. If we experience an event in the empirical realm, in accordance with a priori laws of nature, reason demands to know the cause of this event. The discovery of that cause, however, is not sufficient, as that cause must have been the effect of some other antecedent cause. In order to avoid infinite regression, reason demands a first, unconditioned cause. Such a demand makes the mistake of assuming that the principles that govern objects of experience are applicable to things-in-themselves as well. As a result, “pseudo-rational doctrines” arise that masquerade as truth, yet are merely transcendental illusions(Kant 394).
This transcendental illusion arises when reason takes its concepts, which are subjectively valid for the organization of experiences, and mistakenly assumes them to be objectively valid and thus applicable to things-in-themselves. The result of this is an unavoidable antinomy that must be critiqued by the transcendental dialectic. To illustrate this concept, we will turn out attention towards Kant’s third antinomy which deals with the issue of causality qua the existence of freedom. The thesis of this antinomy states that:
“Causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived… it is necessary to assume that there is another causality, that of freedom”(Kant 409).
On the other hand, the antithesis of this antinomy posits this “causality in accordance with the laws of nature” as the only type of causality, and therefore there is no freedom. Now, it appears obvious that both of the positions are contradictory. Yet Kant rationally proves the validity of each. To prove the validity of the thesis, Kant assumes that the antithesis is true, and subsequently shows that if this is the case, we end up with infinite regression, yielding only relative beginnings, and never a first beginning. However, as the law of nature requires that “nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori” the antithesis is shown to be self-contradictory, and so, the thesis must be true(Kant 410). The antithesis, however, can be proved by first assuming that there is freedom in a transcendental sense. If this is the case, it follows that such freedom would be a cause that has no prior cause, and is thus opposed to the law of causality as we see it in nature. As a concept of the understanding, this law of cause and effect renders experience possible, and we do indeed have experience so freedom is brought to contradiction as well.
If we examine the logical structure of this antinomy, we find that it is a standard reductio ad absurdum argument. As such, we are given two propositions (A and B), and in order to demonstrate the truth of ‘A’, we must assume ‘B’ and illustrate how it yields contradiction, or visa versa. Now, we may also notice that this type of argument is dependant on the validity of both the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. As Kant accepted logic as a completed body of knowledge and ‘the vestibule of the sciences,’ he must accept the validity of such analytic laws, and deny the truth of any type of contradiction. In this way, his division between appearances and things-in-themselves becomes fundamentally important for the avoidance of contradiction. If this distinction is maintained, we man be sure that these analytic laws to not apply to the realm of things-in-themselves, and only serve to organize, and thus render possible, experience. They will be of no use in discerning any truth that is beyond the realm of experience, and so, may not be employed towards a transcendental concept such as freedom.
As was previously stated, however, reason naturally transcends experience, and thus violates this distinction between the sensible empirical realm and supersensible realm of things-in-themselves. The transcendental dialectic exposes the necessary contradictions involved with such application via the antinomies. Pure reason, then, must be actively critiqued in order to keep it within the bounds of experience. In a sense, then, we see that this static division requires an active component to remain in stasis. In this way, we see that Kant has developed a static system of division as a necessity for the avoidance of contradiction. Acceptance of contradiction, for Kant, would invalidate the analytic logic that he sees as representing the operations of the mind. This distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself, though, must be constantly reinforced in investigation, lest metaphysics be reverted back to the stage of ‘merely random groping’ that it was prior to entering the secure path.
Thus Kant believes he has found the truth through enforcing a static distinction between the realms of appearances and things-in-themselves. However, this is a division that must be actively upheld, and so we must ask the question: is it really possible to maintain this static division? In the eyes of Hegel, we most certainly cannot. Now, it is impossible to explain Hegel’s system in abstraction from the experience of the dialectical unfolding, yet a work of this nature is unable to provide all of the concrete moments of this experience due to issues regarding brevity. With this in mind, we shall first attempt to explain, in general terms, a bit of the logical structure of the dialectical experience as found in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Following this, we may then turn our attention to the explicit moments of this experience that witness the collapse of Kant’s static divisions into the movement of infinity.
In a seemingly strong Kantian influence, each standpoint of Hegel’s dialectical experience, prior to the dawn of Self-Consciousness, is composed of antinomies. Within this framework, we may also recognize three key aspects of this experience: namely, the law of noncontradiction, aufheben , and motion. In each standpoint of the development of consciousness, the truth is believed to be external to the self, and so, consciousness first posits a thesis that it believes accounts for the essential other, and thus must be the true. This thesis is then driven to contradiction when closely scrutinized, and so its antithesis must be posited as the true. In true Socratic form, however, demands of explication reveal the contradictory nature of the antithesis as well.
We see, then, that each stage of the development of consciousness is a reductio ad absurdum of sorts, in which, the contradiction inherent within the thesis validates the antithesis, and the contradiction inherent within the antithesis validates the thesis. In accordance with the law of noncontradiction, both of these propositions cannot be true and both of them cannot be false. The law of noncontradiction, then, comes to represent the power of negativity, insofar as that proposition which violates it is negated (i.e. invalidated). Each stage of consciousness, however, faces a situation in which both the thesis and antithesis negate each other, and as such, necessarily affirm each other. To alleviate any potential of violating the law of noncontradiction, then, we see the concepts of double negation and aufheben brought into play.
In analytic logic, double negation (p :: ~~p) amounts to an affirmation of the proposition(Layman 308). For example, It is not true that I am not writing this paper :: I am writing this paper. In the above reductio, we saw that the thesis negates the antithesis and the antithesis negates the thesis, as they cannot both be false, we see a type of double negation that affirms both. Accepting this in the form of two distinct propositions, however, would be akin to accepting contradiction as a valid criterion for truth, and through refusal to accept this, consciousness becomes elevated to a new standpoint. This is the process of aufheben. We see then, that each standpoint is not purely negated, but the antinomies collapse into one another and are subsumed under the new elevated standpoint. This new standpoint subsequently becomes one side of a new antinomy, thus repeating the process. So, Hegel’s general logical structure may be described as organic, or a moving unfolding of truth. Analogous to the bud that “disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom” each standpoint is a particular that is preserved in the universal qua organic movement(Hegel 2).
With this very general, and admittedly abstract, understanding of the logical structure of Hegel’s dialectical unfolding, we may begin to explore the explicit moments in which Kant’s standpoint of static distinctions necessarily collapses into the movement of infinity. Hegel so respected Kant, that his system is given its own moment in the dialectical unfolding qua the final stage of consciousness—the understanding. We shall, then, begin our exploration of the collapse of Kant’s system with the second half of “Force and the Understanding” as found in the Phenomenology.
Now, the understanding is a form of consciousness, and as such, posits truth as external to itself. The understanding has come to recognize force— the dynamic interplay of the one and the many— as externalized in substance. The understanding then takes force to be its object (the other, i.e. truth) yet it recognizes that force is notional, and as such, has subjective components and therefore cannot be true. As the understanding must take the other to be the true, the supersensible world first appears. The understanding takes to be the true world as it is a pure beyond that is devoid of the subjective influence of the understanding. Thus, we end up with a syllogism of sorts, with appearance at the center, and the understanding and the inner being (the supersensible thing-in-itself) at either pole.
This first appearance of the supersensible is in the form of a void. It is necessarily devoid of appearances; as such appearances are subjective via the notional play of forces. In this way, the understanding has no faculty for sensing the inner being of things, and so, it is like “a blind man is placed amid the wealth of the supersensible world”(Hegel 146). It is important to emphasize that, for the understanding, the supersensible world is the world as it is in truth. The understanding has recognized its influence on the world of appearances and must take the truth to be completely external to it.
This development also has important implications for our previous discussion on Kant. Hegel seems to be claiming here that the division that Kant has devised implies that the essential aspect is the thing-in-itself, while the appearance is the unessential due to its subjective components. Now Kant qua the understanding is unable to accept contradiction, and so, the maintenance of this dualism is necessary. However, ceasing investigation with such a dualism implies that we have relegated ourselves only to knowledge of appearances (i.e. the false) rather than attempting to know the true as such. In the following exposition, we shall see that Kant’s position is analogous to the static realm of laws. His categories of the understanding attempt to posit universal laws that organize our experiences. We shall see, however, that this position only represents one side of a much larger antinomy that ultimately collapses into the movement of infinity.
The understanding is not content to accept the supersensible as a void, and so it attempts to grasp it through the mediation of the play of forces. This play of forces is immediate for the understanding, yet it posits the simple inner world as true. Therefore it may only recognize the play of forces as true insofar as it is simple. Through this process, the antithesis associated with force collapse into “the simple element in the play of force itself” or, the law of force(Hegel 148). This law of force is a universal difference, or the “stable image of unstable appearances”(Hegel 149). Thus, the supersensible world becomes the truth for the understanding in the form of a static realm of laws that overarches the flux perceived in the world of appearances.
This static realm of laws, however, is not able to account for the flux inherent in the world of appearances, and so the world of appearances “retains for itself an aspect which is not in the inner world”(Hegel 150). This may be seen as analogous to a categorical relationship between universal affirmative qua universal law and particular negative qua flux of particulars, which, in accordance with the analytic logic that the understanding adheres to, amounts to contradiction. Thus, the understanding allows the universal law to sunder into a plurality of laws, yet this contradicts the simple unity that the understanding takes to be the true. To alleviate these contradictions, the understanding allows the plurality of laws to collapse into the notion of law, in which the plurality of laws loose their specific character.
In order for this notion of law to be taken as true, the understanding must give it external existence. The notion (simple unity), however, is indifferent to its being (plurality of particulars). Thus, the understanding finds a distinction between the notion of law and the expression of law. The expression of law represents the specific determinateness found in the world of appearances, and the notion of law represents the simple unity of the supersensible. This is the same situation that the understanding faced in regards to force, namely that force contained within it force proper (unity) and expression of force (plurality). Law, then, becomes subsumed under force. Force becomes the simple, and “the expression of difference falls under law”(Hegel 152). Electricity, for example, is a simple concept in the form of force. This concept, however, necessarily contains difference within it. Both positive and negative electricity are necessary for the notion of electricity. We see, then, that this is a unity that contains difference within itself—in a word: contradiction. The understanding attempts to account for this by maintaining a distinction between the world of appearances and the supersensible. The notion of law, however, is dependant on the difference of particulars, and is thus conditioned by them, and so this distinction begins to collapse. The understanding attempts to take responsibility for this by stating that the difference is not a difference within the thing in itself, it is only the notion of difference. Through this process of explanation, the understanding recognizes that force and law are in fact constituted exactly the same, and in this tautology, the understanding maintains the stasis of the thing-in-itself, and takes responsibility for the movement it perceives.
With this recognition that force and law are constituted the same, the understanding realizes that this tautological movement was a movement of understanding itself, not a movement within the object. So, as it was unable to avoid contradiction through the positing of the static realm of laws, the understanding shifts to the opposite end of the syllogism (within itself), where it experiences change, in an attempt to account for the flux that was missing in the static realm of laws. The understanding recognizes that force necessarily splits into antitheses, resulting in differences which are none. That which is selfsame “repels itself from itself, and therefore what is repelled is essentially self-attractive, for it is the same”(Hegel 156). With this in mind, the static realm of laws becomes its own antithesis.
The supersensible qua static law was considered to be like its differences, as it remained self-same. This supersensible world was still dependant on the world of appearances for the principle of change, as it was only “the immediate raising of the perceived world into the universal element”(Hegel 157). Now, with the realization that the self-same actually repels itself from itself, the understanding posits a second supersensible world. This world is the inverted world; it repels the world of appearances from itself, and in this way is able to obtain the principle of change that was missing from the first appearance of the supersensible. In the inverted world, then, the things-in-themselves that are posited are directly opposed to those that were posited in the first supersensible world. When this is expressed in determinate moments, that which was sweet in the first world becomes sour in the second, the magnetic north pole becomes the magnetic south pole, etc.
It first appears as if this inverted world and the world of appearances exclude one another. However as was previously stated, the self-same necessarily repels itself from itself. The opposition between the inverted world and the world of appearances is not a static opposition. Rather, these two represent antithesis which are opposites of opposites of each other. In other words, the sourness of the inverted world and the sweetness of the world of appearances are dependant upon one another; each contains the other within itself through the double negation of antitheses. For this reason, “we have to think pure change or think antithesis within the antithesis itself or contradiction”(Hegel 160). Thus, we see that the antinomy of appearance and supersensible is really a difference that is none. The movement between these differences becomes a difference of infinity, and as such, renders possible—and even necessary—the unity of opposites. Through this infinity of opposites that constitute unity, we may account for the law of the totality of the world of appearances, which has three major implications: (1) unity contains difference via the movement of infinity (2) the separations made by consciousness have stable existence only in conjunction with the notion of inner difference (3) This notion renders possible unity through the collapsing of opposites.
In this way, Hegel has shown that antinomies necessarily collapse into one another through the movement of infinity. Kant refused to accept this, as it requires an acceptance of contradiction as a legitimate principle. As a result, it became necessary for him to create a strict division between appearances and things-in-themselves. However, this division must be actively enforced by restricting reason to the realm of experience. Such an approach represents a type of one-sided formalism in adherence with analytical logic, as an embracing of the whole necessarily requires an embracing of contradiction. Hegel sees such a static distinction as opposed to the organic, unfolding, nature of philosophy. He shows that through the development of consciousness, the distinction made by Kant cannot account for the totality of the world as it is, and the collapse of antinomies is necessary for the progression of the philosophical unfolding of truth. Additionally, this requires a reinterpretation of the law of noncontradiction, such that it is not to be taken as a formal law, but rather should be understood in a dynamic sense; as a principle of becoming that is a necessary moment of the movement of infinity. Such a reinterpretation allows for a dialectical understanding of the self and the world, the dawning of Self-Consciousness, and the elevation of philosophy to the standpoint of Science. Indeed, the dialectical unfolding does not end with the collapse of Kant’s static distinctions, but begins to open up a whole array of possibilities qua the dawning of Self-Consciousness.