Welcome to the AndySphere

Introduction

As we undertake actions in our everyday lives, we generally operate under the assumption that we are distinct and independently existing entities interacting with a world of other distinct and independently existing entities. For example, if one were hiking, they must conceive of themselves as a clearly defined subject in order to traverse the terrain with any substantial degree of accuracy. In other words, one must be able to distinguish between themselves, the surrounding trees and wildlife, and any obstacles that they may come across. Is this assumption, however, justified? Does this conception of reality account for the world as it is? Common experience seems to say “yes.” But, if we undertake a thorough investigation into the justification of these interpretations of reality, we may find ourselves empty handed.
For the purposes of this work, the above discussed interpretation of reality will be coined “dualism,” or our “dualistic interpretations of reality.” This is not to be confused with the traditional usage of dualism as it applies to mind/body distinctions. While these distinctions may account for one aspect of duality, as we perceive it in the natural world, this work attempts to understand duality in a two-fold sense. First, as it applies to conceived distinctions between man and the natural world, and secondly, as it applies to the conceptual split between man’s mind and his body. Thus, our dualistic interpretations of reality are founded on a type of double separation insofar as man has become divorced from nature, and from himself.
To begin an exploration of these basic assumptions regarding our conceptions of the structure of reality, we must have a clear idea of how they arose. To accomplish this, we may begin with the evolutionary development of the human species. We may then begin to understand the practical nature of such interpretations of reality, as they may have acted as a useful survival mechanism for early humans. However, we shall also see that through our intellectual development, these dualistic interpretations became amplified, and eventually heralded as an absolute truth regarding the structuring of reality. With this understanding, our dualistic interpretations began to be conceived as universally applicable, and were subsequently applied to the formation of environmental ethics and policy. It will be shown, however, that environmental policy that is based on this type of understanding of reality is proving to be problematic, and thus, currently stands as an obstacle that is reducing the survival potential of the human species.
To alleviate this problematic situation, we must first show that our dualistic interpretations of reality cannot be legitimately posited as absolute truth. To accomplish this, we will explore some of the concepts developed in the philosophy of science. Through these developments we will come to recognize the importance of an accepted paradigm in providing the conceptual framework that, in a given historical context, serves to organize our sense experiences of the objective world. Periodically, however, if such paradigms are faced with critical anomalies they may undergo radical shifts, in which, a new paradigm that is able to resolve the critical anomalies of the old one will be posited. These paradigmatic shifts are so radical that they involve the overturning of fundamental philosophical presuppositions that serve as the foundation upon which the paradigm is based.
With this understanding, we may begin to see that our dualistic interpretations of reality are really a set of philosophical presuppositions that exist at the most fundamental strata of a grand paradigm that serves to organize the totality of the world as we see it. Presuppositions such as these, however, can make no legitimate claims of infallibility. So, we shall see then, that the grand paradigm that is supported by this set of dualistic presuppositions is beginning to face critical anomalies, as it is proving to be ill equipped to produce viable environmental policy. As a result of this, it seems that it is becoming necessary that we undergo a Copernican Revolution of Consciousness, in which, this old paradigm is abandoned and replaced with a new conceptual framework that unifies the human being and the natural world.
With this reevaluation of our dualistic interpretations of reality, we may then explore three alternate modes of thought that do not operate under our traditional set of dualistic presuppositions. Bioregionalism may show us the exact ways in which the old paradigm is failing to produce viable environmental policy, and will subsequently posit a reunification of man and the various ecological communities he inhabits. Secondly, we shall explore a new view of evolutionary biology that emphasizes the importance of symbiotic relationships in the evolutionary process, and posits man as a manifestation of the biosphere. Finally, we may turn to Buddhism, and its understandings of the illusory nature of the self, and the interconnectedness of all things. The synthesis of common themes found in these three modes of thinking will then present us with the foundation of the new paradigm we are attempting to posit.
So, it appears that the assumption that we are distinct and independently existing entities interacting with a world of other distinct and independently existing entities is based on a limitation of our perceptions of reality. While these limitations may have once been a useful survival mechanism, they are now proving to be problematic through the creation of nonviable environmental policy. It then becomes necessary, that we undergo a radical Copernican revolution of consciousness, in order to posit a new paradigm that is able to account for the failings of the old one.

Chapter One:
The Arising of Dualism

It seems that current environmental ethics, and correlated environmental policy, is formulated within a paradigm that presupposes a distinct separation between mankind and the natural world. This presupposition, however, should not be merely assumed. Through a critical analysis of the evolutionary development of the human mind, we shall attempt to show that limitations imposed on our perceptions of reality may have given rise to this concept of a dualistic schism between man and the natural world. Following these evolutionary developments, concepts of duality were reinforced, and altered, by the philosophical influence of Platonic world-views, and eventually heralded as absolute truth through orthodox Christianity and Cartesian methodologies. These philosophical developments resulted in an alleged metaphysical divorce between man and his physical body, which widened the perceived gap between man and the natural world, as man began to perceive himself as separated from both the natural world and his own physical body. Finally, this dualistic mode of thinking became associated with utilitarian ethics, which has provided the fundamental groundwork for the creation of much of our environmental policy. This chapter, then, will give a detailed analysis of the development of our dualistic modes of thought, and how they have become fundamental pillars within our current conceptual framework of reality.
It may sound strange, or slightly far-removed, to begin an exploration of current environmental policies with the very origin of our species. However, a proper understanding of the development of the human mind, and the survival problems it faced, will provide valuable insights into the current conceptual framework that we utilize to organize reality. We currently live in a vastly different world than the one out of which our minds developed, and this contrast will be used to shed light on the reasons why we react to environmental problems in the ways that we do.
With our towering skyscrapers, orbiting satellites, and iPods, it is easy to assume that we are vastly superior, intellectually, to our hunting and gathering ancestors. While this may be true in some sense, it is not due to any major biological improvements within the structure of our brains. In fact, there are no real physical differences between the brain structures of modern man and human beings who lived over 15,000 years ago. Of course, the challenges that the brains of these early humans had to overcome were very different from the ones we face today. Thus, an understanding of the biological development of the human brain may provide us with the foundations for understanding the limitations of perception have led to the concept of duality between man and nature.
It seems probable that evolution has selected in favor of our ancestors with limited perceptions and quick reflexes. After all, in order to ensure survival, the brain of early man must have been able to recognize, and react to, immediate threats to his survival. At its core, the human brain is an evolutionary modification of the brains of early primates, with an increase in size allowing for the transmission of more information. The brain structures of these early primates, in turn, were modifications of those of lower invertebrates. This chain can be traced all the way back to early single-celled organisms. One commonality that has remained throughout this increase in complexity, however, is the ability of the organisms’ brain to create caricatures of reality, which limit the organisms’ perceptions of reality.
The concept of a caricature of reality can be easily understood by a student who has a professor with any type of slight physical abnormality. If the professor has a large nose, for example, an in-class doodle may depict the nose in absurd proportion. The depiction, of course, would be for comic effect; however, in the case of an organism’s brain structure, the matter is much more important. In effect, the doodle with the absurdly large nose becomes the organism’s sole view of reality, and in the process obscures many of the other details that account for the totality of reality as it is. In this way, it seems that all organisms may have developed the ability to filter out many unnecessary features of reality, in response to survival pressures.
As the human brain developed, caricatures of reality became a valuable tool for individual survival. Without them, biologist Paul Ornstein argues that early man would take just as much notice of passing clouds as he would a potentially edible plant, or a lion laying in wait for him. Evolution would never select for this type of behavior, as it is not inherently beneficial for individual survival and reproduction. For example, butterflies rely on the detection of ultra violet light as a means to locate their food source of nectar. Human beings, however, cannot detect this form of light. As we do not feed on nectar, we have not faced evolutionary pressures to develop such sensory equipment. Thus, we are left with a limited perception of reality, as this extraneous sensory data would be of no use to individual survival and reproduction.
The structure of man’s brain seems to have developed a mode of thinking in response to the challenges posed by immediate threats to his individual survival and reproduction. As was stated previously, however, these biological developments took place over 15,000 years ago. Much has changed since this time. However, if the roots of these changes cannot be found in the biological make-up of the human brain, where are we to look? For important insights, we may explore the advent of cultural evolution.
Unlike biological evolution, cultural evolution, in human beings, is not constrained by the gradual processes of random mutation and natural selection. Instead, the mechanism that drives cultural evolution is the collection and passing on of knowledge from one generation to the next. As a result, it can progress at an exponentially faster rate.
Cultural evolution began with the development of language and complex tools, rather than any type of biological advancement of mankind’s nervous systems. With these two developments, positive feedback loops were set into motion. The development of tools, for example, required complex speech, which then allowed for the development of more complex tools, et cetera. These types of positive feedback loops eventually established the conditions necessary for the advent of the agricultural revolution, which effectively altered the dynamic of man’s genetic ability to adapt to his environment, to one of man attempting to adapt his environment to his desires.
The agricultural revolution can be noted as a major acceleration point of man’s development for two reasons. Firstly, the agricultural revolution allowed man to deliberately manipulate the environment for his own ends. Man was no longer tied to the nomadic lifestyle of hunting and gathering. Instead, the development of agriculture actually required him to remain sedentary, while manipulating the environment in order to fulfill his needs.
Secondly, as farming technologies developed, a farming family was able to produce more food than was necessary for its own sustenance. This abundance of food allowed for the beginning of specialization; and, in turn, the advent of civilization. As man became organized in increasingly more complex societies, the every day threats to his individual survival were greatly reduced.
On top of these developments, these increasingly complex societies developed a distinction between cultivated land and the surrounding wilderness. The meaning of the word “wilderness”, in fact, can be traced back to the Old English term wil(d)deornes, meaning wild or savage. This implies that early agrarian societies perceived themselves to be separate, or above, the vast untamed realms, which symbolized a deep fear of the unknown. So, while the agricultural revolution, and increasingly complex social organizations, lessened many of the hardships hunters and gatherers faced, they also laid the foundations for the retention of man’s perceived dualistic separation from nature.
As was previously argued, the biological evolution of the human brain developed modes of thinking that focused on individual survival and reproduction. A dualistic distinction between the individual and nature was an evolutionary necessity within this old framework of existence. Early man must have had some type of limitation of perception, in order to distinguish himself from outside threats to his survival. In this way, the concept of man/nature dualism can be understood as a type of caricature of reality. However, this caricature of reality was not eliminated as the agricultural revolution lessoned its importance. Even though this revolution allowed for increasingly complex social structures, which lessened the everyday survival threats that the individual faced, dualistic interpretations of reality were retained through the medium of man’s manipulation of nature.
This concept of separation between man and nature was later dramatically reinforced by the development of “otherworldliness”. Developments in Western philosophical thought, and religious traditions, involved the rejection of the world as it is, and a search for an understanding of the world as it ought to be. In addition to this, from the perspectives of Platonic and Judeo-Christian worldviews, man is not only understood as divorced from nature, but divorced from his body as well. This has led to a strengthening of the remnants of our dualistic interpretations of reality, as well as establishing the concept’s perceived viability in dealing with threats far removed from its original context.
The Platonic world-view set the stage for the amplification of dualistic interpretations of reality through two important tenets of Plato’s thought. First, Plato’s positing of the Forms devalued the natural world, as it was understood as transient and illusory. Secondly, we shall see that humanity’s understanding, or recollection, of the Forms served as a means of conceptually divorcing man from his own body, and thus widening the dualistic schism between man and the natural world. For a proper understanding of both of these concepts, Plato’s Phaedo may be examined.
To illustrate the existence of the Forms, Plato evaluates our conception of the Equal. We all have an abstract understanding of equality. For example, let us assume that two rocks both look identical and each weighs one pound. Naturally, we are led to assume that these rocks are equal. However, upon closer evaluation, one is bound to find slight discrepancies. More precise weighing instruments, for example, may show that one of the rocks weighs 1.000 pounds, while the other weighs .999 pounds. Thus, the rocks are not truly equal in relation to our abstract understanding of the concept. With perfect precision in measurement, and observation, no two objects can be said to be perfectly equal in the natural world.
This discrepancy, Plato contends, holds with respect to all of our abstract understandings of reality. If the root of abstract concepts, such as the Equal, cannot be firmly established in the natural world, Plato must be able to account for their existence in some other way. To accomplish this, Plato posits the existence of an abstract realm of Forms. This realm contains perfect realizations of abstract concepts such as the Equal, the Good, Beauty, etc. As the concepts cannot be fully manifested in the natural world, Plato has devalued the natural world as a mere imperfect imitation of the abstract realm of forms. Thus a concept of “otherworldliness” is developed, and dualistic interpretations of reality are intensified through this devaluation of the natural world.
This dualistic concept of reality is then intensified even further as man’s knowledge of the Forms provides the framework for a separation of man’s mind from his body. Plato maintains that we have knowledge of these abstract concepts, and that this knowledge could not be acquired through observation of the natural world. To account for this, Plato offers his theory of recollection, which asserts that man’s soul (or mind) must have had experience of the Forms before birth. Our bodies, however, are responsible for transmitting sensory information to our minds. Because our bodies exist in the physical realm, the sensory information that is relayed to the mind is derived from imperfect representations of the Forms. Thus, Plato’s world-view amplifies dualistic interpretations of reality through an understanding of the imperfection inherent in the natural world; as well as a denial of the body, as it confuses the mind in regards to the perfect nature of the Forms. His understanding of the abstract realm of Forms, then, serves to split reality in two, with an emphasis placed on the “otherworldliness” of the abstract realm of Forms.
Perhaps, however, we may understand Descartes as fully cementing the scientific and philosophical foundations of dualistic ways of thinking. Descartes wrote at the dawn of modern science, and the philosophical justification of his new scientific methodology is firmly rooted in a dualistic understanding of the natural world. To illustrate this, we may turn to Descartes’ statement: “I think, therefore I am.” Descartes arrives at this statement by employing radical doubt as a means to discern absolute truth. Through the process of doubting all that he had previously taken to be true, however, he discovers that this process necessarily implies that he must be a thing that both thinks and exists. However, he also discovers that the external world is not grounded on the same type of indubitable truth. In order to avoid falling into a solipsistic rabbit hole, then, he employs his faculty of reason to posit a transcendent creator god. In this way, he is able to take the position that he exists, and he must have been created by God, and therefore he may accept the existence of the external world as also having been created by God.
For Descartes, this faculty of reason must have been given to us by God. Through this understanding, God then becomes the philosophical foundation of Descartes’ new scientific methodologies. If God created the world, for example, he must have also created the laws that govern the natural world, and so, all corporeal things must exist in accordance with these laws. In this way, Descartes advocates a mechanistic conception of the world, insofar as we properly use the faculty of reason, and then impose this rational framework on the natural world. In accordance with this methodology, then, Descartes posits that we will “render ourselves… the masters and possessors of nature.” Additionally, this dualistic/mechanistic framework has become elevated to the highest status of absolute truth, as it is firmly grounded upon the perfection of God.
So, it has been argued that during the time of early man’s development, dualistic interpretations of reality may have been a useful survival tool. As a caricature of reality, it seems that perceived dualism must have been necessary for early man to appropriately react to threats to his individual survival. With the advent of the agricultural revolution, leading to great increases in social complexity, it seems that these threats to individual survival began to diminish. Dualistic interpretations of reality, then, became less than necessary for individual survival. However, this mode of thinking was retained as man began a campaign of large scale manipulation of nature, amplified through the “otherworldliness” of Platonic thinking, and posited as absolute truth via orthodox Christianity qua Cartesian methodologies. These evolutionary and philosophical developments, then, have led to a two-fold separation from nature; as man originally became divorced from the natural world, and later divorced from his own physical body.
As a result of this, man is now working with a mode of thinking that is ill equipped to overcome the challenges of the world we have created for ourselves. This separation between man and nature has led to a situation where “we operate above or apart from the world, within the sphere of our desires and wishes”. Although we may be mentally operating within the “sphere of our desires and wishes,” the deep psychological understanding that we are still physical beings seems to have been forgotten. As a species, however, we are still dependant on our physical bodies. We still require food, water, and many other natural resources, for our physical sustenance, and we are directly dependant on the natural world to provide us with these resources. In this sense, dualistic interpretations of reality have become a new threat to our survival. Regardless, insofar as they have been posited as absolute truth, dualistic interpretations have been retained and manifested through utilitarian ethics, and subsequent environmental policy.
Utilitarian ethics can be simply understood through the principle of utility, which “holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness”. For example, if an action undertaken by an individual promotes his or her pleasure, and reduces pain, utilitarian ethics deems this a morally good action. As the increase of the net amount of happiness is the goal of the utilitarian, however, an action which promotes the happiness of multiple individuals is seen as morally superior.
Within the framework of utilitarian ethics, the remnants of dualistic interpretations of reality appear to be present in the background of John Stuart Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mill separates himself from earlier formulations of utilitarian ethics by recognizing a qualitative difference between the pleasures of the intellect (higher pleasures) and the pleasures of the body (lower pleasures). It is Mill’s claim that the great majority of people would object to having their higher mental faculties removed, even if they were assured bodily pleasure. This is because the higher mental faculties of man allow him to experience greater and qualitatively superior types of happiness. In this sense, satisfying the desires of the intellect offers a greatly superior type of pleasure than the satisfaction of bodily desires. Thus, Mill is able to claim that the pleasures of the intellect are qualitatively superior to the pleasure of the body. So, In line with the Platonic and Cartesian devaluations of the physical body, Mill’s utilitarian ethics recognizes a separation between man’s intellect and his physical body, and claims that the desires of the intellect are of greater importance than the desires of the body.
Mill also applies the principle of utility to all of nature, by claiming that all sentient beings have a right to live a life of maximum pleasure and minimal pain. So, according to Mill’s utilitarian ethics, harming a non-human sentient being, without just cause, is considered morally wrong, as this action does not promote the maximization of pleasure. However, according to Mill’s distinction between the qualitatively different types of pleasure, if human and animal pleasures conflict with each other, human happiness is deemed morally superior. After all, Mill claims that “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied”.
As was previously illustrated, Mill understands the pleasures of the higher faculties to be qualitatively superior to the pleasure of the lower faculties and body. When this understanding is applied to nature as a whole, a situation is created in which the satisfaction of sentient, non-human, beings will always be morally inferior to the satisfaction of humans. Thus, it may be considered morally wrong to cause harm to a non-human sentient being, unless doing so will maximize human pleasure. For example, suppose three people and a dog find themselves in a situation where they are all starving to death, and one of the individuals must be eaten if the others are to survive. As the three people have much higher mental faculties, Mill’s utilitarian ethics suggest that the only morally acceptable action would be for those three people to eat the dog. This action amounts to a recognition of the qualitatively superior satisfaction of the higher intellect. Thus we see that if this ethical framework is applied to environmental issues, it is necessarily implied that man is distinct from, and superior to, the natural world.
Formulations of utilitarian ethics have generally provided the groundwork for environmental ethics and correlated environmental policy. In our every day lives, for example, few people would suggest that allowing the death of a loved one (or any human being for that matter), as a means to save the life of a squirrel, is a morally justified position. Instead, much of environmental ethics and policy has developed as a means to maximize human happiness, while minimizing environmental degradation. We will begin to see, however, that this approach is inherently problematic insofar as it is linked to the previously discussed notions of “otherworldliness”. To illustrate this utilitarian approach to environmental ethics in a concrete way, we may examine William F. Baxter’s case for optimal pollution levels, as well as the scientific applications outlined by Dixie Lee Ray and Lou Guzzo.
In William F. Baxter’s work People or Penguins, the question of the exact nature of a “good” environment is discussed. Baxter contends that people desire clean air, clean water, etc. but the question of the concrete implications of these desires must be examined. It is his understanding that having pollution-free air, water, etc. is not in the best interests of humanity. While low levels of pollution promote human satisfaction, so do a wide array of other things, such as cars, planes, and home heating. However, as we reduce pollution levels, we must pay ever increasing costs.
Contrary to popular conceptions, these costs are not solely measured by money. Instead, costs are understood in terms of the elimination of available resources. For example, if one were to construct a new school, it may be said that the school will cost X number of dollars. This, however, does not account for the entire cost of the school. The resources and labor power that become invested in the construction of said school are no longer available for other purposes. Thus, the cost of the school can be understood as a dollar amount, as well as the consumption of the necessary resources and labor power invested in its construction.
It follows then, that as pollution levels are reduced, society bears the cost in both monetary terms, as well as the consumption of available resources. Baxter then claims that the costs that may be associated with the complete elimination of pollution far outweigh the human derived benefits of “optimal” pollution levels. This is not to say that we should immediately strip the earth of all of its resources in the interests of human satisfaction. People also derive benefits from relatively clean air, watching birds, etc. To maximize human benefits, Baxter takes the position that we should only invest in pollution control in so far as the resources required to do so will provide the maximum amount of human satisfaction. I.e., they will not be diverted from an activity that will provide greater human satisfaction.
Through their work, Trashing the Planet, Dixie Lee Ray and Lou Guzzo illustrate a more scientific approach to the maximization of human satisfaction. To achieve this, the authors explore the story of the rise and fall of the controversial pesticide, DDT. With a utilitarian-influenced approach, the authors claim that a full ban on the use of DDT is not in the best interest of humanity. They argue that scare mongering and public hysteria brought about the full ban on DDT use, not hard scientific data. This has set a dangerous precedent in the creation of environmental policy, as the authors feel that decision-making based solely on hard scientific data is necessary for the maximization of human derived benefits.
The use of DDT has saved millions of human lives through the control of disease carrying insects. In World War I, for example, more people died from typhus, which is contracted from a type of body lice, than bullets. During World War II, however, all Allied troops were sprayed with DDT, and as a result, not a single soldier died from lice-contracted typhus.
DDT use has also been credited with a huge drop in the world-wide number of malaria cases. Public health statistics from Sri Lanka, for example, show that in 1948, before the use of DDT, there were about 2.8 million reported cases of malaria. After a 15 year period of regular spraying of DDT, however, that number dropped to only 17. In the late 1960’s the public outcry against DDT in the United States convinced officials to discontinue spraying in Sri Lanka. As a result, in 1969, Sri Lanka experienced a leap in reported malaria cases back to the pre-DDT levels.
In spite of the seemingly great human benefits derived from DDT use, environmental alarmists cried out against its use. Their attack on DDT use took place on three fronts. It was claimed that DDT could never be broken down in the environment, that it was decimating bird populations by softening their egg shells, and that it was a human carcinogen. It is the authors’ view, however, that none of these claims were scientifically substantiated. Scientific investigation showed that under normal environmental conditions, DDT loses its toxicity within a few days. Additionally, no link was discovered between DDT ingestion and the softening of eggshells. As far as DDT being a human carcinogen, however, the answer is slightly vague. If one defines cancer so as to include all growths, even benign lumps, then DDT may be considered carcinogenic. However, if one limits the definition of cancer to malignant growths that can metastasize (the dangerous forms of cancer), then DDT is not a cancer-causing agent.
Despite the lack of scientific grounding, environmental alarmists created panic in the general public. This, in turn, set the stage for the full ban on DDT use. The general public has great power over our nations elected officials. If these officials wish to keep their jobs, then, they must appease their constituents. As a result of this, our nation’s law makers imposed a full ban on the use of DDT. According to the authors, this set a dangerous precedent, as hard scientific fact (which the authors see as a necessary tool for the maximization of human happiness) was not influential in the creation of new environmental policy.
On a superficial level, both of these concrete illustrations of utilitarian-influenced environmental ethics and policy appear to be quite valid, as they rest on an understanding of the maximization of human happiness as a moral good. As has been shown, however, this idea of the maximization of human happiness has its roots embedded within dualistic interpretations of reality. These dualistic interpretations, however, are not inherent in the fundamental nature of reality as it is. Rather, they originated as a limited perception of reality, which once acted as a useful survival mechanism for the human species. However, through the agricultural revolution and development of the Platonic world-view, this mode of thinking was retained, and amplified. This led to a devaluation of the natural world, as well as to the establishment of “otherworldliness”. Within this context of thinking, humanity began to view itself in terms of disembodied minds, while minimizing the deep psychological recognition of its physical ties to the natural world. We shall see, then, that as this notion of “otherworldliness” is connected with the dualistic interpretation of reality that is held by utilitarian-influenced environmental ethics and policy, said policy begins to become extremely problematic.
However, the argument can be made that the above discussed utilitarian approach to environmental ethics benefits both humanity and the natural world, and not on a merely superficial level. After all, mankind depends on the resources of the natural world in order to meet his physical needs. In order to continue receiving the benefits of these resources, it is in the best interests of humanity to live in a sustainable way. Thus, it may be argued that a utilitarian approach to environmental ethics in fact promotes sustainable living. This framework, however, is problematic, as it does not take into account the vast complexities of the biosphere, or the unlimited desires of the disembodied mind.
As a type of consequentialist ethic, utilitarianism measures the moral worth of actions by the resulting consequences. So, some degree of accurate prediction power is necessary in order to pursue a morally justified course of action. Biological communities, however, are so magnificently complex, that we are only just beginning to understand them. The extinction of just one species, for example, may cause a cascading effect that can alter entire communities beyond recognition. If humans are deriving benefits from these communities, then those benefits may be forever lost, and the maximization of human satisfaction will not be achieved. With the enormous complexities of existing biological communities, however, we will be unable to accurately predict the results of our actions. If utilitarian influenced environmental ethics is unable to accurately predict the results of allowing the extinction of just one species, then it is forcing us to take an extremely risky gamble; a gamble that places the future of life as we know it on the table. This is an unacceptable wager to make, especially if it is based on a limited perception of reality.
While dualistic interpretations of reality were at one point a valuable survival tool for the human individual, these understandings are now proving threatening to the human species. Acting with a notion of “otherworldliness” entails a perception of the natural world as external to the self. With this understanding, the natural world has assumed the role of a means to fulfill humanity’s disembodied desires. As these desires are understood as separate from the natural world, however, physical means will never be able to satiate them. This is clearly illustrated by the understanding of the Platonic world-view that the natural world imitates the realm of Forms, yet always falls short. Analogously, the physical resources of the natural world seem to always fall short of the unlimited desires of the disembodied mind. Thus, dualistic interpretations of reality are no longer viable in regards to environmental ethics and policy. If these understandings are not inherent in the fundamental nature of reality, and have outlived their usefulness in terms of survival value, then they must be abandoned and replaced with new modes of thinking.

Chapter Two:
The Copernican Revolution of Consciousness

In the preceding chapter, we proposed that our paradigm founded on dualistic interpretations of reality seems to have entered into a type of crisis situation, in that it appears ill equipped to resolve problems of environmental degradation. This dualistic way of interpreting reality has, for the most part however, remained as a fundamental presupposition of the mode of thinking utilized by man since prehistory. How, then, can we be certain that man is not in fact distinctly separate from the rest of nature? To handle this question, we must explore the basis of what we understand as fact, and whether or not these facts can make legitimate claims of infallibility. To flesh out this issue, we may turn to the philosophy of science, and the means by which we develop our ideas of truth and scientific knowledge in relation to the natural world. Through developments in the philosophy of science, we shall see that scientific knowledge can make no legitimate claims of infallibility. Instead, we will arrive at a new epistemology that liberates the concepts of truth and knowledge from infallibility and, in turn, will posit the alleged truth of our dualistic conceptions of reality as being contingent upon their practical value to us.
Scientific knowledge is generally understood as being well-founded, insofar as it is derived from the facts. This may be taken to mean that we can utilize careful and unbiased observations of natural phenomena to logically construct theories to account for said phenomena. If we understand facts as claims about the natural world based on an unbiased use of the senses, these facts are then able to provide an objective basis for scientific inquiry. An historical example may be used to clarify the concept of science as being derived from the facts.
In the time prior to the Copernican revolution, knowledge was generally understood as being absolutely certain, insofar as it was derived from the authority of either Aristotle or the church. However, the development of modern science is typically understood as having taken place during the early portion of the seventeenth century when pioneers, such as Galileo, began to appeal to experience rather than authority. When Galileo, for example, first began to direct his telescope towards the sky, he detected a very earth-like topography on the surface of the moon. Rather than absolutely respecting the authority of Aristotelian physics (which understood all heavenly bodies as being perfectly spherical) he logically constructed a new theory based on his observations. Thus, his new theory seemed to be logically derived from unbiased observations, rather than observations that were biased towards the authority of the Aristotelian world-view.
The view of science as completely objective, in so far as it is based on unbiased observations, has important implications for our understandings of scientific progress; as well as our conception of scientific truth. The above described understanding of science implies a process of “cumulative growth of knowledge” in which, new scientific theories are seen as more powerful versions of the previous ones. For example, this view holds that Kepler’s laws of planetary motion were incorporated into Newtonian physics, and that Newtonian physics can be understood as a special case of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, in which, the prediction power of Newtonian physics is limited to objects traveling much slower than the speed of light.
Perhaps even more importantly, this view of science adheres to an epistemological demand for infallible truth. If facts can be derived through unbiased observation, and strict reasoning can construct theories based on these facts, then it seems that scientific knowledge rests on indubitable ground. Scientific progress, then, becomes understood as the steady accumulation of indubitable truth. This implies that there are eternal truths that may be discovered by us through careful observation and reasoning. Within this understanding of science one can see that the philosophical presupposition that man is distinctly separate from nature can be understood as an indubitable truth, as it has been directly derived from our experience of objective reality.
This view of the indubitable basis of scientific knowledge is challenged, however, when one considers the idea that we can have no meaningful direct access to objective reality. In other words, seeing an object in any meaningful sense is not as simple as mere retinal stimulation. Instead, all meaningful observations are obtained through a synthesis between our sense experiences of the objective world and our previously held body of knowledge. The philosopher of science, Harold I. Brown, illustrates this concept through an example regarding our understanding of a typewriter. Brown states that one may not make any meaningful observations about a typewriter just by looking at it; instead, one has to already know what a typewriter is. Thus, meaningful observations result from the synthesis between our objective experience of the typewriter, and our previously held understanding of a typewriter.
This previously held body of knowledge is organized within a paradigm, which will be fully elaborated on in due time. A paradigm, then, effectively governs our modes of understanding that which we take to be objective, and has a very significant impact on the meaningful observations an individual will make. We may examine the conflict between the astronomers Kepler and Brahe as an example of this. Brahe maintained the theory of a geocentric Universe, while Kepler advocated a heliocentric Universe. When Brahe observed the Sun, then, his understanding was that it was a body moving around a stationary Earth. Conversely, when Kepler observed the Sun, he understood it as a stationary body around which the Earth traveled. Each man saw the same objective reality; however, the meaningful observation about the nature of that reality was governed by the theoretical paradigm each man held. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that prior to the Copernican revolution observers saw one Sun and countless stars. Afterwards, however, observers saw one more star in the universe, and countless more suns.
Before we are to fully accept a view of science as being necessarily based on a synthesis between our experiences of the objective world and an accepted paradigm, two questions must be addressed. First, if these paradigms are the basis of meaningful observations, we must be able to describe what exactly a paradigm is. Secondly, if all of our meaningful observations are derived through a synthesis between an accepted paradigm and sense experiences of the objective world, how are we to account for the scientific revolutions that changed the very ways in which we viewed reality? To answer both of these questions, we may look into the nature of paradigmatic shifts.
The concept of a paradigm cannot be easily defined. Perhaps, however, it is best attempted at a holistic level, by examining all of its parts and the ways in which those parts interrelate. At its most fundamental level, the foundation of a paradigm is composed of philosophical presuppositions. These philosophical presuppositions dictate the means by which each paradigm views the world “as being made up of different types of things”. For example, at the foundation of the Aristotelian paradigm is the philosophical presupposition that the transient and corruptible Earth exists at the center of the incorruptible and unchanging heavens. These philosophical presuppositions are vastly important, then, as they dictate the ways in which we view and interpret the Universe, and guide the course of scientific investigation.
With this understanding, we may now explore a paradigm’s web of concepts and propositions that are firmly grounded upon its philosophical presuppositions. Brown describes this web as being made up of knots (the scientific concepts of a paradigm) and strands (the propositions feeding the concepts). To help us fully grasp these components of a paradigm, we may examine Newtonian mechanics. Force, mass, and momentum, are central concepts within Newton’ framework. These concepts are then connected by laws, such as the second law of motion. These concepts and laws, however, are firmly grounded on the philosophical presupposition that the Universe can be understood in a mechanistic fashion.
We have attempted to show that human beings can have no meaningful direct access to objective reality, and so all of our meaningful observations must take place within an accepted paradigm. However, the previously mentioned example of the distinction between stars and the Sun prior to, and following, the Copernican revolution illustrated that we can have significant shifts in our perceptions of natural phenomena. To account for this, we may turn our attention to the nature of scientific revolutions.
Far from the previously discussed view of the nature of scientific progression, which was seen as a steady accumulation of knowledge founded on indubitable truth, Thomas Kuhn sees science as progressing through normal and revolutionary stages. His view of scientific progression is summarized and schematized by A.F. Chalmers as follows:

Pre-science- normal science- crisis- revolution- new normal science- new crisis

Prescience can be understood as disorganized investigation, which, when it becomes structured into a single accepted paradigm, may progress to normal science. Normal science, then, refers to all of the scientific investigation and problem solving work that is conducted within the framework of the accepted paradigm. If the investigation conducted within the framework of a paradigm begins to produce critical anomalies, a crisis situation may develop, in which scientists begin to question the validity of their accepted paradigm. In response to this, a Revolution may occur that posits a new paradigm. This new paradigm would stand opposed to the old paradigm and would have the prediction power to account for the critical anomalies witnessed under the framework of the preceding paradigm. Finally, new normal science may continue under the authority of the new paradigm.
The question then remains, what exactly provides the justification for revolutionary science, and the positing of a new paradigm? Within this question lies a bit of a paradox. As all meaningful observation takes place within the framework of an accepted paradigm, research is only possible after a scientist has committed himself to the validity of a paradigm. So, scientists must work to preserve the paradigm within which they are conducting research. However, as these paradigms cannot be considered indubitable truth, a given paradigm should not be held as such in the light of failures to predict important phenomena.
In order to account for this paradox, it is necessary to have a firm grasp on the different types of anomalies that may arise within a given paradigm. Anomalies may be regarded either as research problems or counter-instances to a given paradigm. An anomaly as a research problem may be understood in an historical context. Scientists working within the Newtonian paradigm in the early nineteenth century observed irregularities in the orbit of Uranus, such that the location of the planet did not match the predictions of the paradigm. Instead of abandoning the Newtonian paradigm, however, the scientists operated within it. As a result, the planet Neptune was discovered and determined to be the source of the seemingly irregular orbit of Uranus. This marked an important step in the development of modern science. The paradigm was not thrown out on account of anomalous observations; instead, scientists used the framework of the paradigm to determine the possible reasons behind the perceived anomaly. Furthermore, it shows that paradigms are not simple empirical propositions that should be thrown out at the first sign of observational anomalies.
An anomaly can, however, prove to be a counter-instance to a paradigm in several situations. First, an anomaly can facilitate the development of a new paradigm if this anomaly is regarded as socially important, and the old paradigm is unable to resolve it. For example, at the time of Copernicus there was a social need for calendar reformation. Ptolemaic astronomy (which was developed under the Aristotelian paradigm), however, proved to be problematic in regards to increasing the accuracy of calendars. This facilitated the Copernican revolution, as the positing of a heliocentric Universe provided the possibility of calendar reformation.
Additionally, anomalies may prove to be counter-instances if they strike at the philosophical presuppositions of a paradigm, and resist resolutions proposed by normal scientists. For example, early astronomers observed the phenomenon of the retrograde motion of planetary orbits. This observation challenged the Aristotelian presuppositions of a geocentric universe, and that of the necessity of heavenly bodies traveling in perfect circles. Attempts were made by normal scientists to rectify this problem. However, without numerous ad-hoc modifications, which led to a complex system of epicycles, the problem resisted solution. This anomaly, then, eventually proved to be a counter-instance to the Aristotelian paradigm, as the Copernican revolution led to a heliocentric Universe that could account for the retrograde motion of the planets.
With an understanding of the different types of anomalies that may be presented to a given paradigm, we may resolve the previously discussed paradox. Normal scientists must assume that the paradigm under which they are conducting research is true, but not eternally true. Assuming the truth of the paradigm under which one is working allows for the maximization of normal scientific research. However, if critical anomalies that resist solution by normal scientists begin to develop, normal scientists find themselves in a crisis situation. From this crisis situation, revolutionary science occurs, and a new paradigm is posited that is more fully capable of resolving these critically problematic anomalies. Once this new paradigm is widely accepted throughout the scientific community, a successful paradigm shift has taken place, and normal science may resume. Thus, we can see that revolutionary science allows for the possibility of the falsification of any paradigm, and so no paradigm should be taken as eternally true.
With this new understanding of the structures of paradigms, and the nature of paradigmatic shifts, we are now in a position to critique the idea of scientific progress as a “cumulative growth of knowledge”. As was previously mentioned, every paradigm views the world as being composed of different types of things. The concepts and philosophical presuppositions change through the processes of paradigmatic shifts, and so previous paradigms cannot be understood as conceptually similar to new paradigms, albeit with much narrower applications. For example, Galileo’s laws state that bodies fall to the earth with constant acceleration. For Newton, however, acceleration is understood as inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the body and the center of the earth. Galileo’s conception of acceleration is pragmatic, in that it can accurately predict the acceleration of bodies close to the surface of the earth. However, his conception of acceleration becomes problematic if it is applied to bodies that are extremely far from the surface of a planet. So, as his law is not conceptually similar to Newton’s, it cannot be considered to be a more limited version of the Newtonian conception of acceleration. Thus we see that science is not a process of “cumulative growth of knowledge”, as each paradigm is conceptually unique.
This new view of science now requires justification through a new epistemology. A distinction between knowledge and belief has traditionally been central to epistemology. As traditional epistemology understands it, the fundamental difference between knowledge and belief is that beliefs can either be true or false; however, real knowledge of something is unchanging and infallible. This doctrine of the infallibility of knowledge has been a fundamental presupposition of traditional epistemology, much in the same way that a geocentric universe was a fundamental presupposition of Aristotelian physics. The old view of science held to this understanding and, as a result, saw science as rationally constructed on the foundation of unbiased observation, implying that scientific knowledge can be understood as real, infallible, knowledge. However, we have seen that one cannot have unbiased observations of objective reality. Instead, knowledge is derived from a synthesis between our sense experiences of objective reality and the conceptual framework of an accepted paradigm. As revolutionary science posits a new paradigm, it radically alters our conception of reality, as well as our body of scientific knowledge.
This new conception of science, then, faces a problem in respect to the infallibility of knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be understood as real knowledge, in the traditional sense, as it can make no claims legitimate of infallibility. Thus, we are faced with two options. Either we deny that we have any real scientific knowledge, or we liberate the concept of scientific knowledge from the demand of infallibility. One would be hard pressed to support the claim that we have no scientific knowledge whatsoever, and so, a revaluation of our concepts of knowledge and truth are in order.
It is Brown’s claim that we may regard scientific knowledge as true in so far as scientists take it to be such, and insofar as that body of knowledge accurately guides scientific inquiry. So, since we can have no meaningful direct access to objective reality, and we have historically witnessed paradigmatic shifts, a paradigm cannot be regarded as an infallible truth. However, if that paradigm is able to resist attacks on its philosophical presuppositions, as well as guide research and solve problems that are of social importance, it may be regarded as true in its practicality. Thus, we end up with transient notions of truth and knowledge. We can never claim that scientific knowledge is infallible, and as this scientific knowledge plays a significant role in our perceptions of the objective world, we cannot claim that any given paradigm is an indubitable truth.
Within this framework, our dualistic interpretations of reality may be understood as a set of philosophical presuppositions that play a significant role in our understanding of the Universe. As we can have no meaningful direct observations of objective reality, dualistic interpretations of reality should not be regarded as indubitable truth. The idea of a dualistic interpretation of the reality did not arise as a strict logical necessity based on the unbiased observation of natural phenomena. Instead, it arose as a set of philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of the reality, which served as the foundation of a paradigm that allows for the efficient comprehension of the natural world. If, then, those philosophical presuppositions fail to resist attacks, or support a paradigm that fails to address problems that are socially important, their validity must be critically scrutinized in order to usher in a new paradigm that is able to resolve these problems.
One may argue, of course, that the idea of a dualistic interpretation of reality should not be viewed as a set of philosophical presuppositions that can be challenged and possibly overturned. Science, after all, has gone through several paradigmatic shifts, and yet the presuppositions of dualism remain. If this is the case, then, dualism should not be understood as a set of philosophical presuppositions that are open to attack.
It is important to note, however, that through the course of a scientific revolution, some of the philosophical presuppositions of the old paradigm may be retained in the new, where they remain until they are sought out and discovered to be problematic. For example, at the dawn of the Copernican revolution, Copernicus challenged the Aristotelian presupposition that the Earth was the center of the universe. However, in his new heliocentric universe, all of the planets were still conceived of as moving in perfect circles. It took the observations of Kepler to challenge this presupposition and posit elliptical orbits for planets.
The retention of the philosophical presupposition that we are distinctly separate from the natural world, then, is accounted for, as it has not yet faced critical scrutiny. It has remained as a specter; a specter that has been lurking in the most fundamental levels of our various scientific paradigms. For it would be incorrect to assume that dualism is a set of philosophical presuppositions found in a single scientific paradigm, rather, they exist as a fundamental aspect of the much broader paradigm that contains the conceptual framework that governs our very interpretation of reality. Within the framework of this grand paradigm, the various scientific paradigms have come to be as a means to organize and drive scientific investigation in various directions. The scientific revolutions, then, can be understood as mere modifications of our perceptions of the natural world; however, these modifications have taken place within the much broader paradigm that governs our interpretations of reality.
To help to clarify this, we may attempt to understand philosophical presuppositions as organized into a type of hierarchy, where the presuppositions at the lower levels are contingent upon the validity of those at the higher levels. This is not to imply that the lower presuppositions are logically deduced from the higher. Instead, the positing of the higher establishes the conditions necessary for the positing of the lower. In other words, the alleged validity of the higher establishes a conceptual framework that allows for a certain range of possibilities for the lower, but does not definitively establish the validity of the lower. So, we may see that if the higher is overturned, the conditioning factors involved with the positing of the lower are removed. If any of the presuppositions in the upper echelons of the hierarchy are overturned, then, a downward cascading effect develops, in which, the lower level presuppositions may become open to critical scrutiny.
For example, at the onset of the Copernican Revolution, Copernicus attempted to overturn the higher presupposition that the Earth was the center of the universe, but he still maintained the lower presupposition of circular planetary orbits. It was only through the overturning of the former (higher) presupposition; however, that Kepler was able to posit the idea of elliptical planetary orbits. This is due to the fact that the concept of elliptical planetary orbits could not be conceived of, if one maintained the validity of the geocentric presupposition. Thus, we see that the conceptual framework that was developed out of the conception of a geocentric universe, established the conditions for the positing of the circular orbits of the planets. The accepted validity of a geocentric universe does not allow for the positing of the elliptical orbits of the planets; however, once the presupposition of a geocentric universe was overturned, so were the conditions under which the circular orbits of the planets was posited. Thus, this lower presupposition became open to critical scrutiny, and eventually was replaced with the presupposition that planets move in ellipses.
So, the philosophical presupposition that human beings are distinctly separate from nature, and other interrelated presuppositions, have been retained through the various scientific revolutions because they are situated at a higher level of the hierarchy, and thus have so far remained immune to critical scrutiny. Currently, however, anomalies in the form of social demands for an adequate method of dealing with issues of environmental degradation are exposing these philosophical presuppositions and putting them under the microscope. Utilizing these presuppositions of dualism, we have created a conceptual framework of reality, within which we are operating as disembodied spheres of desires. This conceptual framework, however, is proving inadequate to deal with issues of environmental degradation, and so we may be seeing the development of a crisis situation in which we are beginning to lose faith in the validity of these presuppositions and their correlated paradigm.
As a result of this crisis situation, it seems that it is becoming necessary that we undergo a Copernican Revolution of Consciousness. Driven by the social demand for calendar reformation, the Copernican revolution overturned the philosophical presuppositions of the Aristotelian paradigm, which resulted in the unification of the heavens and the Earth, as well as radically altering our conception of physics. Additionally, the Earth was stripped of its status as the center of the universe and, instead, became a passive participant in a vast cosmic ballet. Similarly, the social need for the halt of rampant environmental degradation seems to requires a Copernican Revolution of Consciousness; a grand paradigmatic shift that unites the human being and nature, and radically alters our conception of reality. In the process, this Copernican Revolution of Consciousness must remove man from his self-constructed pedestal at the center of the Earth, and view him as a participant, not ruler, of the biosphere as a whole.
Through an understanding of knowledge as being derived from a synthesis between our sense experiences of objective reality and an accepted paradigm, we have attempted to dispel the notion that our dualistic conceptions of reality may legitimately be held as an indubitable truth. In this way, we may begin to see dualism as a philosophical presupposition that serves as a fundamental pillar of a paradigm that we utilize to conceptually organize realty. We have seen that the idea of paradigmatic shifts within the sciences may be taken as an analogy to illustrate the ways in which our conceptions of the physical universe may be radically altered through the process of a scientific revolution. Within this framework, it can be understood that crisis situations within the scientific community develop if an accepted paradigm is unable to resolve problems of social importance, or if anomalies arise that both resist resolution and strike at the philosophical presuppositions of the accepted paradigm. Furthermore, if we regard these philosophical presuppositions as organized into a hierarchy, we can see that the overturning of a given presupposition leads to a downward cascading effect, in which the lower presuppositions may be opened up to critical scrutiny. We may see, then, that the presuppositions of dualism have been retained due to the fact that all of the scientific revolutions history has witnessed have taken place at lower levels of the presuppositional hierarchy, thus leaving the dualistic presuppositions immune to critical scrutiny.
Although the presuppositions of dualism have been retained, it appears that they may be losing their practical value to us. A paradigm founded upon the idea that we are distinctly separate from nature appears unable to satisfy the social demand for the reduction of environmental degradation. As a result, these philosophical presuppositions are beginning to be pulled from the shadows of our conceptual framework of reality. Where it has so long remained hidden, dualism is now beginning to be scrutinized in the light of its failure to meet social demands. We may, then, see this grand paradigm as entering into a crisis phase. Furthermore, in the following chapter, we shall see the specific ways in which this paradigm is ill equipped to deal with environmental issues. This, in turn, will serve as a starting point, from which we may begin to explore alternate modes of thinking that directly attack the validity of our set of dualistic presuppositions.

Chapter Three:
New Modes of Thought, New Paradigm

Thus far, we have seen that our set of dualistic presuppositions arose out of our limited perceptions of reality, and that these presuppositions had practical survival value to the human species. We have also seen, however, that this set of dualistic presuppositions should not be considered to be an eternal truth regarding the structure of that which we perceive to be reality. It was also previously asserted that the social need for the halt of environmental degradation seems to be providing the driving force for a grand paradigmatic shift. If we can show, then, that our set of dualistic presuppositions is no longer advantageous to the survival of the human species, our Copernican Revolution of Consciousness will become philosophically justified.
To accomplish this, we may begin by exploring the precise ways in which this paradigm is facing critical anomalies; namely, through the creation of problematic environmental policy. Many of the key concepts found in bioregionalist thinking will help to clearly illustrate the shortcomings of this paradigm. Bioregionalism will then provide us with a starting block from which we may begin to develop the philosophical underpinnings of our grand paradigmatic shift. From this starting block, we shall explore a new view of evolutionary biology that seeks to eliminate anthropocentric understandings of the natural world. Through a focus on the symbiotic relationships found throughout the biosphere, this new view of evolutionary biology will begin to radically alter our conception of the human species. We will then explore some of the major tenets found in Buddhist philosophy that reject understandings of the natural world as being made up of distinct, independently existing, objects. Finally, the common ground between these three modes of thinking will be examined. Through this process of exploration and synthesis, we should begin to have an understanding of the new paradigm being posited, and the proper role of our set of dualistic presuppositions.
Now, before getting down to the exploration of these three modes of thinking, it is important to note that the following presentations are in no way exhaustive. All three of these modes of thought are extremely rich, and contain a wide array of philosophical implications. Instead, we will attempt to extract some of the fundamental concepts of these modes of thinking that directly apply to the issue at hand.

Bioregionalism:

As a system of thought, bioregionalism is extremely difficult to precisely define due to its extreme aversion to centralized authority. Typically, bioregionalist thinkers are extremely grass-roots oriented, and so, this mode of thinking cannot be traced back to any one individual. However, we can recognize some of the main currents of bioregionalist thought in an attempt to create a working understanding.
A bioregion may be simply defined as a “life place,” or a region that is characterized by its unique human and non-human natural communities. This concept of a bioregion directly opposes our traditional understandings of regions as defined by abstractly created political boundaries that have been imposed on the natural world. We shall see that bioregionalism understands these artificial boundaries as a symptom of human communities attempting to understand, and control, the natural world in a mechanistic fashion. This mechanization of the natural world can also be cited as a result of a conception of the human being as distinctly separate from the communities he or she inhabits. This conceptual framework, however, is ill equipped to handle problems of environmental degradation. On top of this issue, mechanized thought processes have led to a compartmentalization of the “big questions” man asks himself in his search for meaning. To rectify this situation, we shall see that bioregionalism calls for a reestablishment of a sense of place within human consciousness, which leads to a deep integration between mankind and the places he inhabits.
To illustrate this mechanistic world-view, we may turn to bioregionalist thinker Michael Vincent McGinnis. He claims that bioregionalist thinking, albeit under a different title, has actually existed as a type of thought long present in native peoples that learned to live within the communities they inhabited. Now, however, population growth, new technologies, arbitrary nation and state boundaries, and global economics have led to a decline in this type of thinking. Instead we have found ourselves in a situation very similar to the “otherworldliness” discussed previously in this work; a situation in which human communities are operating under the assumption that they are distinctly separate from the ecological communities in which they live. A striking example of this phenomenon is the fact that the average U.S. child can identify 1,300 corporate logos, but only 10 of the plants and animals that are native to their bioregion. This type of thinking has resulted in mankind’s loss of the deep sense of place that integrates him with the ecological communities he inhabits.
McGinnis recognizes humanity as currently living in a mechanized world. This may be understood as a world that is perceived to be composed of distinct and unchanging “parts.” This world-view, however, becomes problematic as mechanized human societies attempt to understand, and thus control, the natural world through mechanical lenses. These mechanical lenses are forged from four core values: bureaucratic organization, economic rationality, modern technology, and resource management. The use value of these four is derived from attempts to promote efficiency, economic growth, and ease/comfort of life for the human individual. The mechanization of human societies has, however, proved to be problematic due to the perceptions of the natural world it implies, as well as the exploitation of the natural world these perceptions have promoted.
The problematic nature of our mechanistic world-view can be illustrated in two ways. First, it has proved unable to properly manage natural resources, and secondly, it has caused us to impose abstract political jurisdictions on the natural world that stand opposed to natural bioregions. To illustrate the inability of mechanistic thought to properly manage natural resources we may investigate its application of the above discussed four core values. These core values understand nature as a static resource. Bureaucratic organization, for example, seeks to interpret nature as a machine that is composed of unchanging parts. In this fashion, the machine becomes understood within our rational framework, and subsequently employed in ways that maximize economic development, and thus, promotes the happiness of mechanistically oriented human beings.
To further understand this concept, we may look to the bureaucratic language associated with the “controlling” of a predatory species. When attempting to deal with a wolf, for example, bureaucratic language refers to the species as a “game unit,” “management tool,” or attempts to create a “reduction strategy.” This type of language implies an understanding that deprives the wolf of its role as a member of an ecological community. Instead, it becomes recognized as a static part of a machine; a machine that may be retooled in a way that best satisfies bureaucratic desires. This understanding is directly opposed to the dynamic and interconnected nature of ecological systems, and so, the retooling of any seemingly distinct “part” cannot be accurately predicted by a mechanistic view of natural systems.
This mechanization of human societies also becomes problematic, as it promotes the creation and implementation of abstractly conceived human political jurisdictions. The boundaries between states, nations, townships, etc. are generally derived from the abstract conceptual level, rather than from real differences between bioregions. For example, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are separated by the Delaware River. This separation, however, is the result of a mechanistic view of the natural world. While it may appear to us that the Delaware River is a real regional distinguisher, this appearance is directly opposed to a bioregional perspective. We perceive the Delaware River as having distinct boundaries; namely, the banks of the river. However, the watershed, and thus the bioregion, of the river extends far beyond its banks. So, we have imposed mechanistically oriented borders upon the natural world. These abstractly conceived borders then generate gross inefficiencies in the implementing of environmental policy, as their interpretation of the natural world is opposed to the actual organization of ecological communities. A salmon in the Columbia River, for example, must swim through 17 distinct political boundaries to reach its spawning ground!
On top of the problematic nature of deriving environmental policy from mechanistic world-views, our separation from sense of place has also had a negative impact on our search for meaning. Mechanistic understandings have caused us to compartmentalize the “big questions” that give us meaning; namely, “who am I?” “where am I?” and “what am I supposed to do?”. Bioregionalist thinker, Robert Thayer, insists that we must examine these questions, not in isolation, but through their relationships to one another. Thus, “who am I?” should understood within the context of “where am I?” and “what should I be doing?”. This understanding is often overlooked in mechanistic societies that do not seek to integrate the self with the community, but rather, seek to subordinate the community in order to satisfy the self.
So, we see that bioregionalism recognizes a type of mental schism between humanity and the places we inhabit. In an attempt to mend this schism, bioregionalism promotes a type of re-inhabitation of the places we live. This requires the abandoning of the mechanistic paradigm that has fostered a perception of us as living in an abstract and mechanically oriented world. To accomplish this, we must develop a sense of place; or a deep understanding that, as individuals, we are members of various bioregions, rather than abstractly conceived political regions. And through this re-inhabitation of place, we will be able to develop viable environmental policy that is derived from place-based knowledge and a sense of stewardship for the communities we inhabit.
Thus, we can see that bioregionalism can be largely understood through its opposition to our current dualistic/mechanistic views of ourselves and the natural world. This system of thought illustrates the shortcomings of our dualistic paradigm by highlighting its inability to produce viable environmental policy. To rectify this, it advocates a return to our sense of place, or the return to a conception of man as a member of the ecological communities he inhabits.
We shall see, in the following sections of this chapter, that this return to a sense of place may largely be accomplished through the development of new and much less limited perceptions of reality. These new perceptions will foster an understanding of the natural world as it is, rather than attempting to filter it through our mechanistic lenses. We shall see, then, that the natural world is characterized by relationships, rather than distinct objects. This new understanding may then provide us with the means to overturn the dualistic paradigm, and subsequently re-integrate man with the ecological communities he inhabits.

Evolutionary Biology

To present this view, we may turn to Microcosmos by Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan. This work covers an extremely wide array of new concepts related to the study of evolutionary biology. Many of the theories put forth in this work have come to be widely recognized by the scientific community (such as their theory regarding the symbiotic relationship between mitochondrial ancestors and eukaryotic cells) however, many others remain in a speculative phase. So, to avoid the pitfalls inherent in presenting a position founded on a single work, we shall evaluate this work thematically. Thus, the overall conception of this work shall be important to us here, and we shall only use specific scientific examples insofar as those examples have been widely accepted by the scientific community.
In Microcosmos, the authors attempt to completely reevaluate our conception of the evolutionary process. Typically, evolution has been viewed as a linear mechanism that is driven by Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”, which has paved the way for the dawn of man. This understanding of the evolutionary process has supported the conception of man as distinctly separate from, and ruling over, the natural world. But, as the authors point out, “The emperor is wearing no clothes”. Thus, through their reevaluation of the evolutionary process, the authors seek to tear down the metaphorical self-constructed pedestal upon which man sits. And through this deconstructive process, they attempt to bring us to the realization that we are, from our very biological composition, manifestations of the natural world and directly connected with the biosphere as a whole. To accomplish this, the authors take a bottom-up approach by attempting to understand evolution as a largely microbial phenomenon. Through this understanding, we will begin to see that symbiosis, rather than competition, is the major driving force behind the evolutionary process.
First, we may see that microbial organisms are largely responsible for establishing the conditions out of which the multitude of complex organisms we see today could develop. Prior to about 2,000 million years ago, for example, the earth’s atmosphere was nearly devoid of oxygen. The microorganisms existing up to this time utilized carbon-hydrogen compounds and the anaerobic process of fermentation to generate their necessary power supply: ATP. By the late Archean period, however, vast bacterial communities had already consumed the majority of the atmospheric carbon-hydrogen compounds, which allowed for the liberated, and lighter, hydrogen to escape to the upper levels of the atmosphere. The earth’s water supply did still remain as a vast source of hydrogen, however, the chemical bonds between oxygen and hydrogen remained too strong to efficiently break down. Then, through a great triumph of life’s adaptability, photosynthetic ancestors of modern day cyanobacteria seemed to have mutated such that they were able to utilize high energy light waves to split these hydrogen-oxygen bonds. Thus, these ancestral cyanobacteria were allowed access to a huge hydrogen supply; however, they also emitted oxygen as a byproduct of these reactions.
Oxygen is highly reactive, and thus toxic to the microorganisms that did not have the ability to process it. Due to its wide spread emission, atmospheric oxygen in the Archeo-Proterozoic period increased from .0001% to 21%. This massive increase in atmospheric oxygen, then, posed a great threat to the early biosphere. Through and amazing adaptation, however, cyanobacteria developed a metabolic system that actually required the oxygen they previously emitted as waste. This new aerobic respiration resulted in a great increase of respiratory efficiency, typically yielding 36 molecules of ATP for every sugar molecule broken down. This great increase in efficiency, and the atmospheric chemistry (i.e., adequate levels of oxygen) it was dependant on, was a purely microbial phenomenon. This development also established the conditions out of which more complex organisms had the opportunity to develop. In other words, “the advent of oxygenic photosynthesis was the singular event that led eventually to our modern environment”.
Out of the conditions established by early bacteria, we may begin to explore the symbiotic process, and the role it has played in the increase of organic structural complexity. A prime example of this is mitochondria, which are found in all animal cells. Most of the ATP generated within these cells, are generated by mitochondria. These mitochondria, however, exist outside of the nucleus, yet they contain their own DNA, RNA, transfer RNA, and ribosomes. This has led many in the scientific community to believe that mitochondria were once independently existing aerobic prokaryotic cells that invaded the cytoplasm of much larger anaerobic eukaryotic cells, and eventually forged a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship.
It seems that the ancestors of modern mitochondria may have been a predatory species that invaded eukaryotic cells in search of food. If the prey managed to stay alive, however, a symbiotic relationship was developed. In this relationship, the eukaryotic “prey” protected the mitochondrial ancestor from the environment; and in return, the mitochondrial “predator” supplied the larger host cell with the large quantities of energy it could derive through its oxygen-consuming respiratory processes. This symbiotic relationship must have proved beneficial to each partner, as is illustrated by the continued existence of mitochondria within all animal cells today. Additionally, the cooperation between the two “independent” organisms allowed for even greater organic structural complexity, as they function as a unified whole much more efficiently than as distinctly independent organisms.
Margulis and Sagan also site the commonality between the structures of all cellular undulopodia (the machinery utilized for cellular movement) as evidence of symbiosis, though this hypothesis remains in a speculative phase. These undulopodia are all about a quarter of a micron in diameter, and all share the same 9+2 structure. This 9+2 structure can be conceived as similar to a telephone dial, where we see nine pairs of microtubules organized into a circle that surrounds one pair in the center. This same structure can be found in the sperm tails of many organisms, the cilia within our lungs, the microtubules that control the movement of chromosomes during mitosis, and even in the nerve cells of our brains. The odds against this common structure occurring purely by chance are so great that the authors have speculated that this 9+2 array is a remnant of a symbiotic relationship between ancient ancestors of spirochetes and eukaryotic cells. The authors speculate that fast moving spirochete bacteria (which have 9+2 structured undulopodia) may have invaded much larger eukaryotic cells in search of food. It remains possible –and perhaps even probable– then, that these two organisms may have developed a symbiotic partnership, in which, the spirochete was provided with food and protection and the eukaryotic cell was provided with the means of locomotion.
Symbiotic relationships that result in an extremely deep integration of the two organisms, however, rarely leave any solid evidence. There is no DNA evidence to support the symbiotic spirochete theory; instead, it can be viewed similarly to the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland who slowly disappeared until only his grin remained. Author David C. Smith states it wonderfully by saying: “The organism progressively loses pieces of itself, slowly blending into the general background”. Thus, the spirochete symbiosis hypothesis may never be proven to be conclusive, and instead will have to remain in a speculative phase. As we saw in the previous chapter of this work, however, science is unable to legitimately posit claims of absolute knowing. And so, this hypothesis may be accepted insofar as it relates to the presupposition that symbiosis drives the evolutionary process, yet has resisted falsification.
With this reevaluation of the evolutionary process, we gain a new conception of the human species. Assuming that evolution is a linear process leading up to the dawn of man becomes equivalent to thinking that the Eiffel Tower was built solely to support the skin of paint at its very summit. Instead, we see that every aspect of our bodies contains a sort of evolutionary history of symbiotic relationships. The mitochondria that exist in all of our cells can be traced back to independently existing prokaryotic organisms. Additionally, it appears that the undulopodia responsible for all active cellular movement, and even the formation of our nerve cells, can be traced back to independently existing spirochetes. Within this framework, then, the human species cannot be considered to be distinctly separate from the biosphere. Rather, we are the biosphere. All organisms, including humans, can be conceived to be a variety of specific configurations of bacterial phenomena. Additionally, all of these configurations are dependant upon the support systems, including atmospheric chemistry, which were developed by microbes millions of years ago. So, far from humans being distinctly separate from the biosphere, we can see that we are both directly dependant on it, and composed of it.

Buddhism

Buddhism, as a philosophical system, is composed of an extremely wide array of concepts, which then contain an even wider array of implications. For the purposes of this work, however, we will be exploring a limited number of these concepts. Particularly, we will explore those that directly relate to the issue of our dualistic interpretations of reality, and provide valuable insights into the nature of the new paradigm we are attempting to create. Those concepts that have particular importance include the Buddhist conception of the self as illusory, the means by which this illusory self develops and reinforces itself, and the relationship between the true nature of mind and the realization of the interdependence of all things.
Fundamental to Buddhist philosophy is the understanding of the “I” as illusory. Typically, we in the West understand the “I” as a static entity that is immune, or at least retains a continuity of identity, to the changes we see taking place every day. We operate with a conception of a metaphysical split between the mind and body, or between the “static I” and the external world of change. In Buddhist philosophy, this distinction does not exist in any real sense. The “static I” is understood to be an illusory concept, or more specifically, what we conceive of as the “I” is a particular configuration of five forces, or aggregates that are in constant flux.
To understand this, it is necessary to have a firm grasp on the nature of these aggregates. First, Buddhism recognizes the aggregate of matter. This aggregate accounts for all of the physical objects in the universe, including those that compose our bodies, our sense organs, and the tangible objects that those organs sense. Secondly, there is the aggregate of sensations, which accounts for the relationships between our sense organs and the objects that they sense. For example, if one were to touch a hot stove, they would feel a sensation that was derived from the relationship between their sense organ (the hand in this case) and an external stimulus (the stove). Third, we have the aggregate of perception, which accounts for the recognition of sensations. The above mentioned sensation that was derived from the relationship between one’s hand and the stove, for example, would typically be perceived as painful. Next is the aggregate of mental formations, which includes all thoughts, ideas, decisions, and mental objects. Finally we have the aggregate of consciousness, which should not be equated to cognizance. Instead, Buddhism also understands consciousness in terms of relationships between sense organs and external stimuli. For example, there is a keyboard in front of me, and I see it, thus, I have visual consciousness. It is important to note here that this visual consciousness is based on my sight, and the existence of the keyboard as a physical object, not my recognition of said object as a keyboard (this would be a form of perception).
The above discussed account of the five aggregates serves to unify the mind, not just with the body, but with all things. All of the aggregates are deeply integrated with, and thus dependant on, one another. So, it is not conceivable that one may exist independently of another. Mental formations, for example, are directly dependant on consciousness, sensations, perceptions and matter. So, we begin to develop a picture, in which, the seemingly “static I” does not exist independently from these aggregates; but rather, exists as an attachment to a specific configuration of them. However, it cannot be denied that we do have a conception of the “static I,” and so an account of its development and retention must be given.
We all have various experiences in our lives that provide us with either pleasure or displeasure. The conception of the “static I,” then, develops primarily out of attachment to those experiences we find pleasurable, and aversion to those we find to be painful. Walpola Rahula relates this to selfish desire in the form of tanha, or thirst. This includes desire and attachment to existence, certain ideas, wealth, power, or any other object we may cling to greedily. These attachments, however, set up a positive feedback loop in which the attachment to pleasurable experiences reinforces the conception of the “static I,” which in turn forms stronger attachments to those sense experiences.
A basic understanding of the Buddhist law of karma may help to clarify this. It is important to note that karma should not be considered to be any type of fate or predestination. Rather, it should be understood as the eternal law of cause and effect. In other words, when we willingly undertake certain actions, we cannot escape the consequences of those actions. When we act under the influence of the illusory “static I,” we build up habits that will undoubtedly affect our future actions. To paraphrase Sogyal Rinpoche, we are now what we have done in the past, and we will become what we do in the present. Thus, if we become habituated towards acting on the selfish desires of the “static I”, this illusory concept will ingrain itself deeper and deeper within us.
Through the process of karmic vision, we may also see how attachment to the “static I” necessarily limits our perceptions of reality. As each individual utilizing the conception of the “static I” actually exists as a complex configuration of habits and specific attachments, the karma generated by these configurations necessarily affects the ways in which we, as individuals, view reality. For example, I was a competitive swimmer for many years, and through that process I gradually built up an aversion to swimming. So, while one person may view swimming on a summer day as pleasurable, I view this activity as a negative, and thus seek to avoid it. In this way, we may see that my perception of reality differs from that of another due to the differing karma we have both accumulated.
In a much more fundamental way, attachment to the “static I” necessarily entails a view of reality as composed of permanently existing distinct and independent objects. In order for the “static I” to perceive permanence in its own nature (i.e., to deny its own mortality), it must view itself as a distinct, independent entity that exists in a world of permanently existing distinct and independent objects. By limiting its perception of reality, the “static I” is able to deny the constant flux, impermanence, and deep interconnections found in the natural world, and thus assert its own permanent nature.
Thus, we may see that the static “I” is an illusory concept. This concept appears to be acquired through attachment to a particular configuration of the aggregates, and a thirst for immortality that manifests a denial of the constant flux inherent in the natural world. If this “static I” is illusory, however, how are we to understand the true nature of mind? To flesh out this issue, we may look to the relationship between the “static I” and the buddha nature.
The buddha nature may be understood as the expansive consciousness that experiences the interconnections between all things through a denial of the selfish attachments developed by the “static I”. It is important to note that this buddha nature is within all of us, however, it remains constricted by attachments to the “static I”. To help to illustrate this, we consider a gestalt shift. When one views a drawing in which two images may be perceived, both images are always present. Upon first glance, however, we may only see one, but this does not mean that the other does not exist. With closer inspection, we may come to realize that both pictures exist and we were limiting ourselves by only seeing one. Thus is the buddha nature, it is always within us, yet attachment to a given view of reality may obscure the big picture, and lead us to believe that this view is, in fact, the only one that exists. This buddha nature, then, sees reality as it is, namely as a continual flux of experiences and objects that are deeply interconnected with one another.
We see, then, that Buddhism does not recognize a real metaphysical split between the human individual and the natural world. Instead, this split is seen as an illusory conception born from attachments to permanence, and specific configurations of the aggregates. This illusion also reinforces itself through habitual action, and obscures the true dynamic nature of reality from us.

Synthesis

In seeking common ground between these three modes of thinking, we find three major themes. First, All three of these modes of thinking reject the conception of man as distinctly separate from the natural world (i.e., our set of dualistic presuppositions). Bioregionalism clearly illustrates the ways in which this set of dualistic presuppositions proves to be problematic when applied to environmental policy. The views of Buddhism and evolutionary biology then provide evidence of the structure of reality as it exists beyond our limited perceptions. That is, they provide an understanding of the natural world as being characterized by relationships that supercede the limited perceptions of reality that are imposed on us through our set of dualistic presuppositions. This understanding, then, calls for the removal of man from his self-constructed pedestal, and a recognition of the necessary unity between the human being and the natural world.
Secondly, we see that all three modes of thought recognize the interdependence of all things in the natural world. Through the countless symbiotic relationships developed throughout the history of evolution, we see that each organism can legitimately be described as a specific configuration of bacterial phenomena. On top of this, we have seen that the attempted mechanization of the natural world has fostered a type of misunderstanding, insofar as each species becomes recognized as a distinct “part” of a machine. Each species, however, is a member of an ecological community, and the use terms “member” and “community” here, imply a situation characterized by mutual dependence
This understanding leads us to our third theme, namely, that the conception of the human being as distinctly separate from the natural world is directly opposed to the structure of reality. All three of these modes of thought recognize the human being as a configuration of various phenomena, rather than a single distinct entity. Through this framework, we see that the natural world is a world of relationships, rather than a world of distinct and independently existing objects. The human being, then, is no different, as it is also bound within this web of relationships. We have seen that our very biological composition is structured out of increasingly complex symbiotic relationships. Additionally, we see that both the communities that the human being inhabits, and the configurations of the aggregates that give rise to our experiences, are extremely influential in creating the being that we refer to as “self.” In this way, we see that the “self” is directly tied back to its membership to given ecological communities, which may then be holistically tied back to their microbial ancestry. So, the limited perceptions of reality that have fostered a conceptualization of the human being as a distinct entity opposes the structuring of the natural world, insofar as it is characterized by relationships rather than distinct parts.
Through this investigation into the common ground shared by these three modes of thought, the fundamental presuppositions of the new paradigm we are searching for have emerged. Our Copernican Revolution of Consciousness, then, may be characterized by new and much broader perceptions of reality. Rather than attempting to impose an outdated and dualistically oriented schema on the natural world, we must attempt to transcend our limited perceptions of reality in order to see the world as it is. In doing this, we have come to the understanding that our set of dualistic presuppositions are based on philosophically shaky ground. If this is the case, then, they must be abandoned in the light of the threats they are posing to both humanity, and the stability of the biosphere. Thus, our new paradigm, with its understanding of the natural world as characterized by relationships, is able to incorporate a much deeper understanding of the nature of reality, and subsequently produce more viable environmental policy. It then becomes almost imperative that we accept this new paradigm, as the old one is inhibiting the survivability of our species, as well as many others.

Conclusion

It remains rather difficult to provide a conclusion to this work. Far from being conclusive in any sense, this work is intended to be a starting point for exploration into the new paradigm we are positing. We have, however, reached some resolution in regards to our critique of dualistic interpretations of reality. We have seen that these interpretations are based on limited perceptions of reality. However, over the course of our intellectual development they became elevated to an understanding of allegedly accounting for the absolute truth of the structure of reality as a whole. This thought process, however, has proved to be problematic when applied to environmental policy.
In response to this, we have attempted to understand our dualistic interpretations of reality as philosophical presuppositions existing at the most fundamental levels of the grand paradigm that organizes our sense experiences of the natural world. As this grand paradigm is now facing critical anomalies in the guise of nonviable environmental policy, we have posited the apparent necessity of a Copernican Revolution of Consciousness. Where the Copernican revolution unified the heavens and the earth, this revolution of consciousness attempts to mend the conceptual schism between man and the natural world. Thus, we have arrived at a new grand paradigm.
Now, it becomes important here to bring out a few issues regarding this paradigm. First, at this stage our new grand paradigm remains quite vague. As was previously mentioned however, this work is intended to be a starting point into exploration of this new way of thinking. It is not intended to provide all of the explicit details of our new paradigm, but only the fundamental ground work from which a conceptual web may be developed.
Secondly, it is important to bring out that we have in no way suggested a complete elimination of dualistic interpretations of reality. Our critique of these interpretations has instead focused on liberating them from ties to absolute truth, and illustrating the problematic nature of conceiving of them as universally applicable. Within our new paradigm, we may continue to operate as if we are distinct and independently existing entities in certain circumstances. We may not, however, continue to assume that this interpretation of reality accounts for the natural world as it is. So, dualistic interpretations of reality, then, must be considered to be a type of tool that may be applied when it is practical, and rejected it becomes problematic. For example, dualistic interpretations of reality would be applicable to the hiking scenario outlined in the introduction to this work; however, their application to environmental policy has proved to be extremely problematic.
Finally, this work has not posited an explicitly formulated environmental ethic in correlation with our new paradigm. The reason for this is the currently vague nature of the new paradigm being posited. It seems necessary that this paradigm become more fully developed and articulated before any solid ethical theory may be derived from it. In this way, it also becomes impossible to formulate an ethical critique of this new paradigm. Ethical systems that may be used in a critique of this new paradigm are necessarily derived from the conceptual framework of the old paradigm. As we have illustrated the failings of this old paradigm, and the apparent necessity of a grand paradigmatic shift, the ethical systems derived from this old paradigm must also necessarily undergo a radical shift.
Our new paradigm, then, may be taken to be a new foundation for a new system of explicit environmental ethics and subsequent policy. When humankind comes to the deep psychological recognition that we are, on a multiplicity of levels, directly tied to the biosphere, a radical transformation of environmental ethics seems sure to follow. Within this new framework, we are offered the opportunity to discontinue the exploitation of the natural world as a means to satisfy our conceptually disembodied minds. Additionally, we may come to interpret reality in a way that is much less problematic for all living creatures.
So, it seems then, that we have recognized the problematic nature of our current paradigm, and this recognition must be considered to be the first step in alleviating the problem. In this way, we may see that the clear articulation and ethical implications of our new paradigm are contingent upon first recognizing the problematic nature of our current paradigm, and their exploration may be left for a later time. What we have found, however, is nothing less than a new understanding of man and his place in the natural world. Where man once considered himself to be distinctly separate from the natural world, our new paradigm posits him as being directly tied to the biosphere in many ways. This critique, then, has led to a new paradigm that both reevaluates our conceptions of ourselves, and serves as a matrix, within which, new environmental ethics and policy may be developed. Thus, the current environmental issues we face should not be considered to be problems that are external to us, but problems with our conception of ourselves.

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