On Humanistic Marxism

Karl Marx stands as one of the most influential—and controversial—thinkers of the nineteenth century. His works have been adopted by a wide range of people; from social revolutionaries with dreams of utopian societies, to brutal dictators who perverted his works to legitimize large-scale violence. An attempt to slough off all of these historical influences and pin down the “real” Marx, or the “humanistic” Marx, then, proves to be quite a difficult undertaking. To begin with, we may start at the most abstract levels of his thinking, and work our way down to the concrete. We shall first attempt to develop his framework of the dynamics of human cultural evolution and all of its interrelated facets. Subsequently, we may investigate alienated and unalienated modes of human conscious activity, and the ways in which these modes of human conscious activity are manifested within the framework of human cultural evolution. Working with these conceptions, we may then begin to investigate the human spiritual dimensions, as they may be implicitly present within Marx’s thinking. With this in mind, we shall attempt to offer an interpretation of Marx that remains uninfluenced by the dominant historical applications of “his” works, and attempts to present the important humanistic currents that are necessary at the most fundamental aspects of his system.
To begin our exploration of Marx’s thinking we must have a firm understanding of the concept of being-in-the-world. By taking this concept as our starting point, we may account for the basic ontological foundation of Marx’s thinking, and subsequently investigate its concrete manifestations. Being-in-the-world may be taken as “conscious activity that is transformative of the natural world as well as formative and transformative of human existence itself” (Brien, 2). This general formulation entails the relationships between the self, other human beings, and the natural world. It must be emphasized, however, that these relationships are active relationships, in that the conscious activities of the human being necessarily effect, and are affected by, the natural world and other people.
If we elaborate on this conception of being-in-the-world, we shall see that it also implies that there are subjective aspects inherent within objective reality. In a proper dialectical fashion, Marx seems to set up a dualism between mankind and nature, yet each aspect proves to be internally dependant on the other. Human consciousness, for example, is often considered to be distinct from the natural world. However, as biological organisms, human beings are physically dependant on the natural world; so much so, in fact, that Marx claims that “nature is the inorganic body of man” (Marx, 293). Such a statement also has profound implications for the relationship between nature and human consciousness; insofar as nature has the ability to influence, to a large extent, the ideas generated by the human being. As a result not real subject/object dichotomy can be legitimately posited.
In addition to this, Marx takes objects to have very real subjective aspects insofar as human conscious activity is necessarily transformative of nature (Marx 400). The keyboard I am using to write this paper, for example, did not develop purely through natural processes alone. To a large degree, it was made by a laborer in a factory. As such, the object that is this keyboard has been imbued with human conscious activity. We see then, that in correlation with this concept of being-in-the-world, human conscious activity is an externalization of the human being qua the objectification of human activity. Human beings necessarily objectify themselves through developing ideas, or potential creative powers, and actualizing them by externalizing themselves through transformative activities on the world.
Up until this point, however, we have only discussed one side of being-in-the-world, namely, the externalization of man in the form of activities that are transformative of the natural world. It must be noted that human conscious activity is also “formative and transformative of human existence itself”. In this way, the modes of human conscious activity necessarily change over time. This also means that human nature necessarily changes of time as well. This may sound a bit strange at first, as human nature is typically taken to be a static, essential aspect of humankind. If one were to be asked: “why do people have an insatiable desire for money?” A common response may be: “well, that’s just human nature, human beings are essentially greedy.” For Marx, however, such an understanding neglects the dynamics of human cultural evolution. Human nature, as such, is merely generated out of a particular and dominant mode of human conscious activity, and so it is most definitely subject to change over time (Brien, 5).
To elaborate on this, we must have an understanding of the dynamics of human cultural evolution, and all of its associated facets. To be specific, these facets include the forces for production, the patterns of social relations, and the social superstructure. In Marx’s system, however, it must be brought out that these facets are all directly interrelated with one another, and as such, cannot be fully examined in isolation from each other. With this in mind, we will attempt first to offer a general understanding of each of these three, and then we will examine their interrelations, and finally, we may see how ‘human nature’ arises from a particular mode of conscious activity in the world.
Marx recognizes that human beings may be considered different from animals because they “produce their means of subsistence” (Marx, 409). Allowing for a few exceptions, animals do not manipulate their environments as a means to derive sustenance. Human beings, on the other hand, farm, build homes, domesticate animals, etc. As soon as a human being engages in such an activity he or she is necessarily externalizing him or her self by transforming the natural world, and transforming and forming his or her self. What human beings are, then, may be first understood through the things that they produce, what they use to produce, and how they produce (Marx 409). To get a deeper sense of this, we may look to the factors that contribute to these forces of production. These factors include: human labor power, skills and knowledge, available technology, available resources, and the human needs being fulfilled (Brien, 6). We see, then, that we may begin to develop a concept of human nature as it correlates with these forces of production. Also, it is important to point out that these forces of production are directly tied to the natural environment that the human society finds itself in. Natural resources play a role in the ‘things people produce’ as well as the needs and unique knowledge and skills of that group of people.
Out of the specific configuration of the forces of production for a given society, we may begin to examine that society’s dominant patterns of social relations. Marx illustrates this through the division of labor within a society (Marx, 410). The division of labor produces specialization within a society, which largely influences that society’s patterns of social relations. To begin with, Marx notes the division between industrial and agricultural labor (Marx, 410). This results in a type of specialization of particular social groups; as “individuals who are productively active in a specific way enter into… definite social and political relations” (Marx 413). If we take the United States of America in pre-civil war times for an example, we may see that the largely industrialized north had patterns of social relations that were far different from the agriculturally based south. In this situation, the terrible social relations between white and African American individuals in the south were largely developed out of agricultural modes of production that encouraged slavery. Such patterns of social relations, however, changed (for the most part) over time as modes of production that were founded upon slavery vanished in the south.
Out of this interplay between a society’s forces of production and dominant patterns of social relations arises the social superstructure. This social superstructure may be understood as a “complex of ideas and social institutions” (Brien 6). With this understanding, we may now begin to see the ways in which human consciousness is increasingly conditioned by a plurality of factors. First, the natural world influences man’s specific needs, and ultimately substantially influences the forces of production. Following this, the dominant patterns of social relations influence man’s consciousness as well. For example, a plantation owner in pre-civil war America may feel that he is justified in his poor treatment of African Americans due to his conditioning to an environment where such social relations were supported. Ultimately, it seems as if we may posit the social superstructure is the pinnacle of these conditioning factors. Social institutions are derived from ideas, which are generated by people who have been conditioned by this multiplicity of factors.
Now, it may be tempting to regard this social superstructure as an epiphenomenon of sorts. However, it is important to recognize that it does in fact influence relationship between forces of production and patterns of social relations in substantial ways. First, “this complex reinforces and stabilizes the given complex of forces of production and social relations” as these forces of production and social relations are only relatively stable if taken in isolation from the social superstructure (Brien 7). The forces of production are continuously developing, which creates friction when paired with the patterns of social relations. Such changes in the forces of production do not immediately change the dominant patterns of social relations, due to individual adherence to a given ideology. However, as tension mounts between these two forces, new ideas develop, which alter the social superstructure and bring new social institutions into play. These new social institutions, then, may cultivate new patterns of social relations that become harmonized with the new forces of production (Brien, 7).
In this way, we may see that the forces of production, patterns of social relations, and the social superstructure are all dynamically interrelated with one another and the natural world. Within the framework of the social superstructure, the forces of production significantly influence the patterns of social relations. Additionally, perceived human needs may be generated out of a specific configuration of social relations, which will influence the development of new forces of production. Moreover, the natural world also influences the forces of production based on the availability of certain resources, and specific human needs among other things. Through man’s externalization of the self via forces of production the natural world may also come to be influenced by human social organization.
Perhaps more importantly, however, we begin to see the ways in which ‘human nature’ is generated out of these relationships and the reasons why it is subject to change over time. Marx claims that “the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is directly interwoven with the material activity and the material relationships of men” (Marx 414). It has been shown that such material activities and material relationships change over time in response to changes in forces of production, social relations, and the social superstructure, and so our idea or conception of human nature must necessarily change as well. In this way, we also see that human social organizations may not be taken as static structures that are grounded on a universal and unchanging definition of human nature. In fact, social organizations are constantly changing and adapting to new challenges, meeting new needs, and witnessing new concrete modes of social relations between individuals. Marx, then, offers us a conception of human society as engaged in a type of cultural evolution, and as such, it must be recognized as a dynamic process.
Working within Marx’s framework, we may now begin to investigate both alienated and unalienated modes of human conscious activity. First, alienated modes of activity take four forms: Alienation from one’s product, from activity, from others, and from the species-essence. Similarly to the previously discussed facets of human social organization, these forms of alienated activity are interrelated with one another, and so, they cannot be fully examined in isolation.
Marx begins by outlining the social configuration that serves as the matrix, from which, alienated activity develops. He refers to this configuration as “political economy” insofar as it is grounded on the presuppositions of private property (Marx 288). Private property generates a situation, in which, men only produce so that they can own (Marx 277). From this, develops a capitalist system that may be characterized by a battle between individuals with the intention of dominating others via their greed for material products. Such a social configuration distorts the conscious activities of man, resulting in the four forms of alienation.
First, man becomes alienated from his product. The product of the worker’s labor is not owned by him, but by the capitalist. He has entered into a system where he is reduced to the level of a commodity, as he gives up the product of his labor in exchange for wages. As a result, his product stands against him as an alien object (Marx 289). The laborer’s conscious activity has undoubtedly been the externalizing of himself, however, he becomes a slave to the very object that contains his conscious activity. In order to physically subsist, the laborer becomes dependant on the wages received from the product he produces, yet does not own. In this way, he is reduced to the level of a commodity himself, and the product of his labor stands against him as an alienated object.
In correlation with this, the worker is not only alienated from his product, but is alienated from the activity of production as well. If the worker is alienated from the product of his activity, he is necessarily alienated from the activity as well (Marx, 292). Insofar as the worker receives wages, rather than ownership of his product, labor is not considered to be the satisfaction of a need, but is merely a means to satisfy his physical needs. As a result of this, labor becomes a forced activity, such that the laborer feels like a robot or a tool for the use of another while he is working, and only feels free when he is not working.
Such a conception is opposed to the species-essence of man, and so, he is alienated from that as well. This may be understood in the context of being-in-the-world. The species essence of man is characterized by the type of free conscious activity that forms and transforms his species and imbues objects with his conscious activity. Remember that man is separate from the animals insofar as he produces, yet in the capitalist political-economy, the laborer comes to equate production with slavery. In this way, we see that the worker is alienated from his species essence, insofar as his essence (free conscious activity) is recognized only as a means for his physical existence (Marx 294). As a result, the worker only feels free when he is engaging in animalistic behaviors such as eating drinking and procreating, and feels enslaved when engaging in the conscious activity that constitutes the species-essence of man.
As a consequence of this, man is alienated from other men as well. The alienation of man from himself—his species-essence—greatly influences the relations he has with other men. The laborer recognizes his activity as a torment to him, and so, it must be the pleasure of another man (Marx 297). His product is owned by another, and so he sees this other as dominating over him, and comes to regard him as an alien and hostile object. The result of this seems to be that human qua human relations are negated due to the alienation of mans’ products and instead human qua object relations dominate. Humans come to see each other as hostile objects, or as a means to produce, rather than other individual human beings.
With this depiction of alienated activity, we may see that it is not a particular activity but a mode of being that permeates all three facets of human social organization. In the capitalist political-economy, the forces of production are largely dominated by a conception of laborers as commodities, thus alienating them from their products. This arrangement subsequently influences the dominant patterns of social relations, such that man becomes alienated from others as well. Additionally, the social superstructure of the capitalist political-economy has developed out of these two facets, and produced social institutions that adapt people to alienated lifestyles, thus reinforcing the status quo. Due to the dynamic nature of human cultural evolution, however, we are not necessarily permanently relegated to such a lifestyle. Marx offers us a vision of an unalienated mode of being through free conscious activity and genuine communism.
In the capitalist political-economy, both the activities of the worker and the capitalist are alienated activities as they are characterized by objectification and appropriation respectively (Brien 14). In general terms, we must point out the free conscious activity is the integration of such objectification and appropriation such that the two become harmonized with one another (Brien 14). This transforms production from a life-denying to a life-affirming activity, as it no longer serves as a means to an end, but stands as an end in itself (Brien 14). We may also recognize communism as the positive overcoming of the capitalist political-economy in general, and private property in particular. Now, both of these conceptions are admittedly presented in a generalized and abstract format. In order to get a firm grasp on what Marx is trying to project, then, we must investigate the more concrete particular aspects of communism and free conscious activity to get a feeling of their interrelatedness to one another.
Marx projects communism as the harmonization of man and nature, man and others, and man and himself (304). In addition, with genuine communism comes the resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, individual and species, and production and life-affirmation. Such a social organization brings man back to man in a sense; it brings him back from the objects he has imbued with his activity yet stand over and against him. In order for this to come about, it becomes necessary to supercede private property and reconcile the individual with the species. As long as people are producing for wages, in order to own, it seems that they will, on a large scale, be living alienated lifestyles. To reconcile the individual with the species, then, this type of lifestyle must be superceded.
As a result, mans’ essence (conscious activity) becomes reconciled with his existence as well. Conscious activity is no longer life-denying insofar as it is a means to acquire wages. Instead, it becomes life-affirming. Free conscious activity may be expressed as the externalization of man for himself. No longer must he exchange the product of his labor for wages, but instead he satisfies his existential need to produce for himself. Such free conscious activity, then, is also the full actualization of human creative powers in harmony with the species-essence. Such a free force of production must also influence the patterns of social relations in a positive way. As the human being begins to more fully manifest his species-essence, he may begin to alter the patterns of social relations as well. The patterns of social relations found in the capitalist political-economy were largely characterized by relations between humans qua alienated objects. However, with the manifestation of free conscious activity within the framework of genuine communism human beings are brought back to their social existence, and may relate to one another as humans qua humans.
Such would be a sketch of an unalienated mode of being. When private property is superceded and the capitalist political-economy is replaced with genuine communism all of the previously discussed forms of alienated activity are alleviated. The result is a harmonious integration of man’s creative powers such that they become expressed in life-affirming ways. To be sure, however, Marx also states that such and affirmation of life requires a sloughing off of the transcendent religious realm, and “communism thus begins (Owen) with atheism” (Marx 305). Are we to take this to mean that Marx’s paradigm is devoid of any type of spiritual dimension? In the following, we shall see that through a qualification of what is meant by ‘spiritual’ Marx’s paradigm does, in fact, allow for a spiritual dimension.
In the above citation, and in various other places throughout Marx’s writings, Marx criticizes the conception of God that was contemporary to his time. Such a God is life-denying in a sense. As this God is conceived to be transcendent, it numbs people to the problems of this world through a metaphysical dualism that emphasizes the promise of a transcendent eternal world as it ought to be. This may be taken as an alienated spirituality, of sorts, as mans spiritual powers are conceived to be outside of himself, and in fact, stand against him as a type of authoritarian power (Brien 233). This distinction between the spiritual dimension and the manifested religious form of such a dimension allows us to explore spirituality as it may be projected within Marx’s paradigm and remain consistent with his criticisms of religious dualisms.
To properly understand this spiritual dimension, we must have an understanding of the basic existential needs of the human organism. Namely, these needs are: the need for meaning, the need for community, for creative expression of one’s potentials, for a viable worldview, for a viable value system, and the need for wholeness (Brien 225). The spiritual dimension, then, may be taken as the dimension of the human psyche where these existential needs “resonate and make themselves felt in lived experience” (Brien 232). However, we must also recognize that this spiritual dimension has both conscious and unconscious levels, in which, the existential needs make themselves felt in either conscious of unconscious ways.
Now, this is an admittedly broad characterization of the spiritual dimension. To elaborate, then, we may define “spiritual forces” as dynamic energies that develop in the unconscious, and crystallize in the consciousness in “determinate patterns corresponding to particular ways of addressing existential needs” (Brien 232). Remember, that for Marx, “consciousness is… from the very beginning a social product and will remain so as long as men exist” and so, particular manifestation of this spiritual dimension is necessarily liked to a particular form of social organization via the consciousness of the individual (Marx 422). For example, within the capitalist political-economy, alienated lifestyles have led to a frustration of individuals’ expression of the existential needs. The configuration of the forces of production, social patterns, and social superstructure within this social organization all act as conditioning factors that act on individual consciousness in such a way that the spiritual dimension is perverted and finds its manifestation in alienated forms of religious expression.
In correlation with this, it seems that the spiritual dimension exists in primarily potential phase. Through the development of various forms of human social organization this spiritual dimension has been manifested in the concrete-real in an equal number of forms—some more existentially viable than others. It seems that we may recognize its full actuality as analogous to a completely unalienated mode of being. It would consist of addressing the existential needs of the human organism in meaningful ways through free conscious activity. In addition to this, it would require individuals to co-operate in a social configuration that does not promote the alienation of individuals from themselves, from others, from the species-essence, etc. Such a free manifestation of the spiritual dimension of man will not be easy. There is a large amount of “social karma” of sorts continually regenerating the capitalist political-economy through reinforced habitual behavior (Brien 240, 244). However, if groups of people begin to coalesce and reject alienated lifestyles, we may begin, as a species, to move towards a more complete actualization of the spiritual dimension.


Part II
In the above, we have attempted to paint a portrait of Marx that highlights the humanistic aspects of his thinking. We see him as deeply concerned with the external factors—qua various forms of human social organization—that generate human suffering, and existential dis-ease. However, it was also brought out that Marx stands as one of the most controversial thinkers of the nineteenth century. Many people have flat-out rejected his social scientific paradigm, and to a large extent such rejections cannot be justified. In the following, we shall investigate two major alleged premises for rejecting Marx’s theory; namely, the idea that communism can never be actualized, and that Marx’s atheistic tendencies invalidate his works.
Many arguments for the rejection of Marx’s social-scientific theory have been grounded on the perceived basis that communism can never be actualized. Such arguments tend to be at best preemptive and at worst founded on a distortion of Marx’s own thinking. The argument that communism can never be actualized is often grounded in an historical context. Communism has not yet come about; therefore we may say that human nature is such that it will never be actualized, and Marx’s vision is merely a pipe-dream. Such a view, however, is a completely preemptive negation of communism, and hinges on a faulty understanding of human nature.
We may turn again to pre-civil war era America to provide us with an insight into the fallacious nature of such an argument. Say someone in the south was to put forth the idea that slavery be abolished. It is likely that they would face criticism in that the south was economically dependant on slavery for its agricultural practices. Moreover, in this context, the domination of whites over African-Americans may have been seen as an aspect of human nature due to the socio-cultural climate of the time. A respondent may then make the claim that the abolition of slavery is a mere pipe-dream because it (a) has not yet happened, (b) is necessary for the economic status quo and (c) is the domination of another race is an aspect of human nature. Quite the contrary, we see that forces in the social superstructure did in fact put an end to the practice of slavery, thus altering the forces of production, dominant patterns of social relations, and future conceptions of human nature.
Arguments have also been put forth that Marx’s thinking should be rejected, as it has been put to real use in the former Soviet Union, China, and Cuba among other places with negative results. Here, the meaning of the term ‘real’ must be brought into focus. Marxism as it was employed in the aforementioned countries was not genuine Marxism in the way that Marx himself intended it. Indeed, these applications of his ideas focused purely on the economic aspects of his thinking at the expense of the necessary humanistic aspects. For Marx, genuine communism pervades all aspects of social relations, forces for production and the complex of ideas and social institutions. It is characterized by the free conscious activity of individuals within a social organization that fosters the fulfillment of the individual’s existential needs. Surely then, communism was not really employed by these countries, as they were missing the fundamental humanist aspects of such a system. And this type of rejection of Marx’s system must only be seen as the rejection of a distorted variation of Marxism—a variant that can only charitably be described as Marxism.
Finally, many have rejected Marx’s thinking based on his criticisms of religion. However, it is extremely important to recognize the species of religion that Marx was criticizing. The formulation of religion that was contemporary to Marx was seen by him as an oppressive and life-denying human construct. A form of religion that recognizes a metaphysical dualism between this world and an eternal supernatural world often renders people complacent and accepting of the problems of this world, while robbing them of the desire to change things. This, however, is only a particular manifestation of the spiritual forces of man. It seems that Marx would be able to accept (or at the very least tolerate) a less alienated form of man’s spiritual energies. For example, Marx’s paradigm seems to allow for a conception of God that promotes social justices in this world, and fulfills the existential needs of the human organism in meaningful ways. So, rejecting Marx on the basis of atheism is much too broad a claim, as his criticisms were directed only towards a particular manifestation of the spiritual dimension.
In this way, we see that many rejections of Marx’s thinking are based on preemptive rejections, or misinterpretations of the foundations of his thinking. Perhaps, then, if we may bring ourselves to look at Marx objectively his social-scientific paradigm will provide us with a framework that we may use to address individual and social concerns in ways that maximize human creative potentials and provide the foundation for existential fulfillment.




Works Cited

Brien, Kevin. Marx, Reason, and the Art of Freedom. Philadelphia, Temple University
Press: 1987.

Marx, Karl. Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. Lloyd D. Easton
and Kurt H. Guddat. Garden City NY. Doubleday: 1967.